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In the Supreme Court
of the State of U tab
UTAH LIGHT AND TRACTION CoMPANY,

Plaintiff,
v~.

P-uBLic S·ERVICE CoMMliSSION oF
UTAH and AIRWAY MoToR CoAcH

LINES, INc.,

DefendaJnAts.

PLAINTIFF'S BRIEF
I.
ST·ATm]M·EN·T OF THE

·,c~~s.E

Statutory Review pursuant to Section 76-6-16, R. ·S.
U. 19~33, ·of a Report and ·Order of defendant, Public
Service :Commission of Utah, dated March 14, 1940
(~R. 56) issuing Certificate of Convenien.ce and N·ecessity
N·o. 534 to defendant, Airway Motor ·Coach Llines, Inc.,
authorizing the holder thereof to render s·ervi~ce as a
comm.on motor carrier of pa.s.senger~s between S~alt ·Lake
City, and Murray, Sandy, Crescent, Draper, Midvale,
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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West .Jor·d:an, Riverton, Taylorsville and Bennion, Utah,
over -certain designated routes.
On January 24, 1940 defendant, Airv;ay Motor ·Coach
Lines, Inc., filed with the ~C-ommission its application for
a Certificate ·ot .c:onvenience and N e·cessity to render rthe
serviee authorized ull!der the above order, (R. 1). A heaTing pursuant to statute was ordered and a. time set, (R.
9) and notice giVlen (R. 10-11). The granting of the application wa.s protested in writing ·by plaintiff, Utah
Light and Traction 'Company (R. 16, et seq.) and in addition, at the hearing, by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad
Corporation (R. 23) and various other parties, (R. 24
to 26).
Issues ,of fact raised by the protests (R. 16 to 19)
and framed by the statutes of the State of Utah in su0h
cas·es made and provided (!Sections 5 and 6, ·Chap. 6·5,
Laws of Utah 19·35) were :
1. T·he fi~nancial ability of
the proposed service.

appli~cant

to perform

~whether

or not the highways to :he used
pursuant to the applicati,on were already over-burdened with traffic.
2.

Whether or not t;he public convenience and
necessity require the p·roposed service, or any part
thereof.
3.

4. The effect of the proposed serVIce upon
existing serviee, ·and whether or not the pr,oposed
service would be an unneiCessa.ry duplication of serv-
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iee between either other common motor carriers or
eompeting steam a.nd electric railroads.
On this last issue plaintiff alleged (R. 17) and
defendant, Air\Yays -admitted (R. 44) that for many
years pri,o-r to 19·33 plaintiff operated an electric street
railway for common carrier passenger service hetwe~n
Salt Lake ·City, Murray, Midvale and Sandy, for whic:h
since that date 1has been substituted a motor gas bus
service operating pursuant to Certificates of Convenien-ce
and Necessity Nos. 305 and 409, issued by defendant,
Public. ;Service Commission. Plaintiff alleged (R. 18)
that a porti•on of the propos.ed service wa.s in '' dire·ct
conflict'' \Yith the above servi·ce of the plaintiff, that the
public in this particular territory was adequately served,
that there was no reasonable nece:s:Sity for the proposed
duplication of service which would jeopardize the ability
of plaintiff to ·furnish its existing service, both in this
territory and in other territories s·erved by plaintiff, and
wo'uld result in an economic loss not of benefit to the
pubiic as a whole. To this the defendant, Airways,
replied, (R. 45) admitting that part of the prop•a:sed service was in direct confli,ct 'vith that of applicant, but was
justified because:
(a) Plaintiff's servi·ce south of 33rd South was
inadequate and irregular;
(b) The public for this reason,favored the Airways'
application;
(.c) Plaintiff's fares were excessive and thus proihibited general public us-e of its service;

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

4

(d) Plaintiff's op·erati,ons south of 33rd South were
unpr.ofitahle to date;
(e) Applicant was offering additional serVI·Ce to
other c:ommunities without servi·ce, contingent upon the
granting of the entire application.
Defendant, Airways, further admitted (R. 46) that
the granting of its Applicati,on would jeopardize the
ability of plaintiff to ,continue to render service south of
3'3.rd South and to Murray, Midvale and Sandy, but
claimed that the granting of the Application would permit
plaintiff to abandon this allegedly unprofitahle operation, and .t1hus he of benefit to the balance of plaintiff's
system.
F·ollowing the hearing at whieh evidence both oral
and written wa:s adduced (R. 27 to 42, Tr. 1 to 3·62), the
Commission filed its Report (R. 51 to· :5:5) and the Order
1

now under attack by the plaintiff. Pursuant to Section
76-6-1'5, R ..S. U. 19·33, plaintiff ·filed its petition for rehearing, (R. 59, et seq.) containing the matters required to
be set forth by the rules of procedure of the c:o,mmission.
This petition was denied without opinion, on May 15,
1940, (R. 105 ), Commissioner Wiesley of the Public Service c:ommission dissenting (R.. 105), and,on May 17 plaintiff applied for a review of the order by this Court.
The Record ·certified by the C:ommission to the ·Court
pursuant to the Writ of Review contains als'o' an affidavit
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(R·. 103-4) filed May 7, 1940 whieh will hereinafter be
referred to by plaintiff, together '\Yith a dissenting opinion
by Commissioner ,,-.-iesley filed May lH, 19~40, (R. 107110).

Apart from the merits of this review .certain proceedings in this Court haYe been had with respect to plaintiff's
applicati·on for a stay pursuant to 1S;ection 76-·6-17, R. S.
u. 1933.

II.
STATE:MEN·T OF

ALDE~GED

ERRO·R,S.

The alleged errors in the order of the Commission
may be classified under .the following general headings,
and in eomp.Iian·ce with statute were presented to the
Commission
-(R. 59-62) :
A.

in

plaintiff's

Petition

for

Rehearing,

That the ·Commission failed to make find-

ings of fact on issues rna terial to the hearing.
B.

Tha.t the Commission made findings of fact

n<>t supported by any substantial evidence, and in
some cases in ·conflict with stipulated or uncontroverted evidence to the contrary.
0. ·That the Cummission acted contrary to law

1

and in violation of

~the

Sta.tute;s of the .State of Utah,

and in an arbitrary and capricious manner in ~certain
particulars hereinafter set forth.
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III.
P~ARTI~CUILAR

Q·UES:TIONS INV·O·LVE·D.

The particular questions involved for determinati,on
under the foregoing category of errors are as follows:
A. Should the Report and Order be vacated and set
aside, and the proceeding remanded, because the Commission failed to make findings of fact on material issues as
follows:

(1} As to the extent of the existing servi'Ce of the
plaintiff, Utah L~ight and Traction ·C:ompany, into the
area. affe-cted by the application.
(:2) As to the extent of existing service rendered
by other co~mon m·otor carriers and ·electric railroads
into the area. affected by the application.
(-3} As. to Wlhether or not the existing service being
rendered by plaintiff in the territory aff.e.cted is reasonably adequate to meet the needs of the publirc; and if
not, in what respeets .such existing service is inadequate,
and whether or not plaintiff has been and now is willing
and ready to render adequate service.
( 4) As to whether or not the existing service being
rendered ihy pr,otestants other than .plaintiff into the
territory affected is reasonably adequate to meet the
needs of the public; and if not, in wthat respects such
existing service is inadequate, and whether or not said
protestants have been and now are rea.dy and willing to
render adequate service.
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(5} _._\s to w·hat service, if any, into territorie:S other
than those now serYed by plaintiff and other protestants,
is neeessary and convenient and in the public interest,
and "yhether or not plaintiff or .other protesta.nts has
been and no\v is ready and . willing to render such service.
(6) As to \Yhether ·Or not the proposed service would
be an unne-cessary duplicati•on of serYice between that
rendered by plaintiff and other protestants.
B. Should the Report and Order be vacated and set
aside, and the proceedings remanded to the :Commission,
because the Commission made findings of fact not supported by any substantial evidence, as follows:

(1) .-,.The rates now in effect are the lowest that
this Commission has been able to procure. How·ever,
voluntary reductions would a.t any time have been in
order. When the Co-mmission has sought reductions the
attitude of the Traction Company ihas been that the operation of this line, as also the op·eration of the Traction
system a.s a whole yielded little or n•o return upon the
investment, and if the ~f.urray..!Sandy line "\Vere granted
further reductions, it would mean that the now meager
net operations of the Traction Company would be further
reduced and the users of the !S'ervi·ce in .Salt Lake City
would be foreed t.o carry in part the eosts of the service
beyond ·tJhe ·city limits." (Report p. 3, R .. 51).
(2)

''* * *

but in a case such as this where the

proposed rates are in some instances as much aS: forty-
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s1x percent under the present rates
p. 3, R.. 5·1) .

*

*

* (Report

(3)i ":1ft ~ * there :is at the pre-sent time no
reason to suppose that such patrons will n,o,t continue to
enjoy the benefits of these rates.'' (Report .p. 4, R. 512.).

"·The: granting of this application will not substantiafly detra:et from nor impair existing common
carrier service * * *.'' (Repo~rt. p. 7, R. 55).
(4)

C. Should the Report and Order be vacated and set
aside, and the case ·remanded, because of arbitrary and
capricious action contrary to law and in violation of
statute in the following respects:

'The C·ommission has issued a ·C·erti:ficate of
C;onvenience and Necessity although applicant has not
obtained franchises or licenses from the local C'ounty
and .City authorities concerned, as required by law.
( 1)

(·2) 'The C~o~mmission has issued a Certificate of
Convenience and Necessity despite evidence on which it
itself ha.s found that applieant has not the financial ability
to properly perform the servi·ce proposed.
('3)

The ·C'ommission has issued a Certificate of

Convenience and

Neces~sity

without taking int·o' considera-

fion the existing transportation facilities in the territory
.proposed to be served by applicant and the offer of existing facilities to furnish any additional or

~supplemental

service determined by the c,o,mmission to be necessary
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and ronvenient, thus creating- an unne•c.e,ssary duplication of service.
(4) The Commission has issued a c·erti:flca te of
Convenience and N ecHssity based not upon findings of
convenience and necessity, but on a contrast between
rates and s-chedules of the vari·ous prote.stants, concerning which no adequate findings are made, and applicant's
pr·oposed rates and schedules.

IV.
BRI~EF

·O·F THE A.RJGUMEN'T.

Error.s set forth in the first two ·c.a tegories a.re with
respect to the Report of the c·ommission insofar a's it
failed t·o make, or erroneously made, findings of faret.
Certainly the Report did not pretend to be responsive to
the allegations admitted and the issues framed in the
pleadings filed by the parties to this. case. Plaintiff is
mindful, however, of the test whic:h this Court laid down
with respect to these matters in the case of Salt L·ake
City vs. Utah Lig1h1t a.nd Traction C'omp·afYI.ty, 173 P. 55·6,
5·2 U. 210, wherein it was said on page 56:2 of the Pacific
Reports:
''While it is true that the Utili tie.s Act
·expres.sly requires the ·Commission to make findings, and while it is also true th'at the commission
should be careful to make proper findings respecting the material ultimate facts upon which an
order is ha,sed, yet we cann,o·t see wherein the
plaintiffs, ·Or any one else could have been, or can
·be, benefited if the findings had been far more
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.speeific. When the findings and the opinion filed
by tthe commission .are -considered together, as in
this ·case we think they should be, we are of the
·opinion that the objection that the findings are
insufficient is not tenable, and hence that objection
must fail.''
Plaintiff is also mindful of the scope of the judicial
review ·Of the ·Commis-sion's a'Ction, this court having said
in 1918 in the above ca.se at page 562:

''' * * * After a careful examin~tion of
the authorities we are more than ever eonfirmed
in the opinion that all t:hat we can review in cases
.of this kind is whether there is any .evidence to
sustain the findings of the eommissi•on, whether
it has exercised its authority according to law,
and whether any constitutional rights of the complaining party 1have been invaded or di.sregarded.
In view that the ·commission is merely an arm of
the Legislature through whom that !body acts in
ma.t.ter.s of this kind, but a moment's reflection
eonvinces any one tha.t this court may not interfere eX!cept for the reasons just -stated. If interference vvere extended he;yond those limlits, it
·w~ould, in effect, be an interference by this court
with the lawmaking p·nwer of this state. It requires
no argument to s:how why that may not he done.
W·e have no more right to interfere with the dutie•s
and powers of the Legislature than tha.t body has
to interfere with the powers and duties impos·ed
upon us as a court. True, the Legislature could
perhaps have give.n us ,somewhat gr·ea.ter powers
t.o pass upon the findings and orders of the commission. Suc:h has been done in some other jurisdictions. The Legislature of this state has, however, noit .seen fit to clothe thli.s eourt with greater
powers of review, and we have neither the inclination nor the right to exerrc~se a power which
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1~

neither inherent

nor

* * • ,,

properly

conferred.

It may not be a1niss to note that ·only in the instant
ease, inYolving: in so far a.s plain.tiff and at least one
member of the 'Commission are ·concerned, a ''departur·e
from basic or fundamental principles,''' has plaintiff
s·oug·ht judicial review of any- ·Of the dozens of orders
made by the P11blie Service

·Cominis~sion

with respect to

the operations of plaintiff, despite the fact that such
orders may have been vigorously protested by pl·ain:tiff
before the Commission. But let us consider the Report
and Order now under review'":
A. The Commission has failed to make findings of fact on
the following material issues:
(1) As to the extent of the existing service of the plaintiff, Utah Light and Traction Company, into the area
affected by the application.
(2) As to the extent of existing service into the area
affected by the application, rendered by other common
motor carriers and electric railroads.

After setting forth in the preamble (R. 49)

t~he

con-

tents of the application, the C·om1nis.sion finds with
respect to these matters (R. 50) ''there are at the present
time two common carriers operating in the territory
proposed to be served .by applicant.

The Salt Lake &
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Utah Railroad Corporation operates i:n the terri tory
adjacent to Redw·ood Road and has five trains north into
S'alt Lake City and five from Salt Lake City south per
day, which stop approximately every mile to take on and
discharge passengers. ·The Utah Light and Traction
Company operates a bus service south upon State Street
~s·erving Murr'ay, Midvale and Sa~dy.
Its schedule is
22¥2 minutes during the peak peri•ods and 45 minutes at
other times.''
These findings do not cover the fact that the proposed service would duplicate exi,sting service with the
sole exception of cross-·county servi-ce between Draper
and Riverton, Draper and .Midvale and Murray, Riverton
and Midvale and· Murray, Tayl•orsville and Murray, and
a small ·stretch between ·Taylorsville and Riverton. Yet
this duplication is admitted by the pleadings (R. 45, 46)
in so far as Traction ·Company is

invol~ed;

wa,s admitted

by Exhibit ''' B-, (R. 34) whi,ch was prepared by the
'Traction Company and admitted in eviden:ce as the joint
exhibit of all parties to ·correct an errone•ous representation set forth by applicant's Exhibit (R. 8); and was
admitted by the

witne~ss

Leslie W. Davis, President of

the Airway Motor :C;oach Lines, Inc., (R. 129, Tr. 16).
Davis testified tha:t the application did not contemplate
any .ehange in existing .service to Mill ·Cteek,

H·o~laday

and service rendered by appli·cant under other certificates of conve.n!i·ence

an·~

necessity on the east part of
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the County to Draper< 1 >; that servi,ee do,\rn the center of
the County ""'ould duplicate the present route of the Utah
Light and Tracti,on ·Company (R. 131, Tr. 18)(2), and
that the only additional service p·roposed over existing
serYic.e \Yould be cr-os~S connections in the southern part
of the County (R. 130, Tr. 17) (3).
The Report ignores
pany service to

~he

~lurray,

fact that the Tra.cti,on Com-

1\fidvale and Sandy has been

rendered over a period from 30 to '50 years, and sinee

(l)Q.

ref€rring to the territory in the MiU Creek and Holladay
area. As I understand the application there is no change involved as far as that service is ooncerned?
Now~

A. No, sir.
Q. Referring to the present service of the Airway rendered to the
Draper area, there are two changes, as I understand it, ·contemplated; one is to eUminate the direct pre•sent route from 96th
South and 7th East to Draper by turning west on 7th East and
96th South, being Sandy, to State Street, and then proceeding
south on State Street to the Draper junction, and thence east.
Is that right?
A. Well, no; not just exactly. \Ve intend to cut !that off at that
east Sandy junction and turn that Draper bus around and send
it back. Draper will be served by another bus from Murray in.
Q. Will ther€ be any substantial change in the service to the
Draper area over that now being rendered?
A. Practically, no.
(2)Q. Now, with respect to the third type of operation, the pr.e·sent
route of lthe Utah Light and Traction Company will be duplicated,
will it not, with the exception of your amend.ment on 64th South?
A. With the exception of that amend·ment, and with the excepltion
of the fact that after we get to 33rd South we wiU swing over
to Main Streett, rather than proceed up State Street.
(3)Q. Now, with respect to the pr·oposed service to the western part
of the territory, Riverton, Benni<Jn, Hibbard, Taylorsville, and
West Jordan, as I look at the exhibit the only additional service
that is propos~d over existing service is a ·cross connection
between West J.ordan and Midvale, and between Taylorsville
and Murray. Is that a fair statement, Mr. Davis?
A. And between Taylorsville and Riverton along that small red line.
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1917 in a~cc.ordance with the orders of the defendant,
Public Service Commission (R. 434, 'Tr. 322); and that
the present operations are rendered in acCtnrdance with
certificates of ·convenience and ne-cessity is,sued by the
Public Servi,ce 1Commission (iStipulation-R. 43-3, Tr. 321).
(3) The Commission failed to find as to whether or not
the existing service being rendered by plaintiff in the
territory affected is reasonably adequate to meet the
needs of the public; and if not in what respects such
~existing service is inadequate, and whether or not
plaintiff has been and now is willing and ready to render
adequate service.

A great. deal of the testimony was directed to complaints with respe-ct to the service of the Traeti,on Company. Mayor Berger said that there were a great many
protests as to the S'clliedules and f:ares (R. 19·6, Tr. 83).
On cross examination he admitted attending hearings
ibefore the Public Servi~ce 'Commission with respect to
m:ore frequent schedules and lower fares (R. 200, ·Tr. 87),
but lhe did not recall the subsequent ·changes in ,s·chedules
or far·es, probably .because he had not used the service
for nearly ten years (R. 201, Tr. 88). Further, on cros.s
examination he ~stated that he thought a 20 minute schedule was adequate (R.. 207, Tr. 94); this incidentally was
substantially the s-chedule of plaintiff as set forth in the
Cbmmission 's findings ( R. 51) .
1

T!he witness, Albert E. White, who used the Traction
bus ·serviee only occasionally, was of the opinion that the
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service of the Traction Company was not frequent
enough, and stated thalt he had had trouble understanding the fare structure (R. 236, Tr. t23). This was based
upon hearsay (R. 241-2, Tr. 128-129) which the Commission admitted over objecti•O!l (R 241, Tr. 128).
The witnes.s H. M. Morris, had h·ad .similar trouble
"With respect to what he termed were frequent -changes
in schedule and difficulti·es with the fares ('R. 2'66, Tr.
153). He knew about the ,difficulty with resp-ect to the
fares because he had a brother riding the bus to the
Univer.sity (R. 267, Tr. 154). He also w.as griev·ed because.
his motJher had told him that some months hefore a. pa.rticula.r operator was '' pus·hing the people to get on the
bus, yelling at them to get Qn. '' He him,self had no
difficulties. (R. 270, Tr. 157). He did not ride regularly;
'''just off and on'' (R. 2:71, Tr. 1'58). Mo s.t of the trouble
had occurred since a recent fare ·chan·ge; ''before they
changed the fares everything went pretty smoothly''
(R. 272, Tr. 159·).
1

Eennetli Farr was another witness for appli,cant in
thi,s res·pect and was particularly wormed with respect
to the change in fare-s of November 1'5, 19~39. However,
on :CI"toss examination he admitted tha:t hi·s misunderstanding could have be-en avoided ''if I had sense enough
' to ask'' the conductor for information (R. 316, Tr. 204) ~
Harry Eckman was the final witness for applicant
who testified, not for himself because he rarely rode the
bus as he has a ~car; he felt that the ·S·chedule .south of
Murray was very inadequate (R. 409, Tr. 297); and his
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knowledge ahout the situation was such that he hard none
~th respect to ·dhanges in schedules and admitted his
testimony was "just hearsay." (R. 410, Tr. 298).
Not one .of these witnes,ses for plaintiff w·ere regular
patrons ,of the Tra,c:tion Company service. In contrast
Mitchell Hayden, .appearing in his own interest, did not
own a car and used the bus every day. He wanted the
'Traction Company to continue to serve becaus-e their
farHs would be cheap·er for him due to his use of the
transfer privilege. Of ~course the more ,service and the
lower the fares, the better. (R. 301, Tr. 188).

J. H ..Sampson, appearing on his own initiative as
a writness for plaintiff, was a resident of Murray, a regular patron for ·2:6. years and does not use a ear. He
thought the .servi·ce wa:s all right, hut wanted lower fare-s.
He too wanted the 'Traction Company to ·continue because
the transfer privilege afforded lower fares, and if only
the applicant should serve Murray ''it w·ould cost him
double." (:R. 362, Tr. 250) He had found the operators
of plaintiff to be courte,ous and efficient. (R. 365, Tr. 253)
H. E:. Aamodt, also of Murray, had used the service
of plaintiff regularly for 16 years. Hci.s testim·ony wa·s
the .sam·e a.s Samp,son 's, and of 1eourse he wanted a more
frequent ·s-chedule such as was giv.en in 19~39. (R.. 3-66,
Tr. 2'54)
1

With respeet to changes in schedules and fare·s, the
testimony of Mr. Jed F. Woolley, ·General Manager of
the Traction Comp·any, was un.c-ontradicted to the effect
that the ~Company was willing to comply with all orders
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of the Publi~ SerYice Commission 'vith respect to matters
of fare, convennence t~o passengers, schedules of service
and routing (R. 434, 'Tr. 422) : that the Company kept a
constant "Tateh on the use of the present service and
"Thether more serYice 'Yas needed, and took occasional
traffic c,hecks hy actual count w·hich were available for
public inspecti•on (R.. 435, Tr. 323); t:ha.t a route change
south of Murray had been put into effect on order of
the Commission (R. 4;38, Tr. 326), the effect of whi~1h
was to eliminate certain service from State ·Street, south
·of 48th ISouth in Murray; and th·at changes in both sch,edules and fares, inv-olving the service in question, were
made under orders .of the Public Service C'Ommission
during 1939 (R. 452, Tr. 340, et s.eq.)
Finally applicant stipulated that the operator,s of
the Traction Company handling the service in question
had had a great deal of experience in ~service, and have
endeavored to give ·Courte·ous servliee (R. 412, Tr. 300);
and that the only ·change in time s-chedules .since January
1, 1937 was that involving trial service from December,
193:8 to December 23, 1939 operated hy ·order of the Commission (R. 412, Tr. 300). Operator Wade also testified
that the only change in fares on this line in many years
had been the fare reduet~on effective N ov·ember 15, 193:9,
and that after explanation to the passengers there was
no trouble (R. 413, Tr. 301).

Let us kee.p in min·d the statement of this court in
the case of Los Angeles lf· Salt Lake Railroad Compwny
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V'S.

PUJbl!ic Utilities Commission, l5 P. (2d) 3:58, 80 U.

455, "'There is no absolute standard ·o.f a reasonable,
adequate, ·or efficient. ·s·ervice. There is a point· at which
almost .any one might S'ay that servic.es were inadequate,
'and theTe is a point above which almost any one could
~say that the railroad ·Company was giving more in the
way. ,of fa,cilities than it .should he required to give. But
in between these points it w·ould he somewhat of a.matter
of each man's judgment as to what the quantum of
servi-ce ·should he * * * '' (in order to meet the requirement of i8eetion 7'6-3-1, R. S. U. 19-33).
In view ·Of the testimony of Mayor Berger we might
also ·call the ·C'ourt's attention to the ·cases .(~'ollated in the
P. U. R. Digest, "Monopoly and Competition", Section
50, where the cases are uniform in holding that popular
dissatisfaction with existing ~service because of some
pers~onal animosity i·s no reason for authorization of
competing service. In this conneetion we submit that it
was .significant that none of t'he several hundred regular
pa tftons of the servi-ce appeared at the hearing in ,support
of the Application; that on the contrary several regular
patrons appeared to protest the Application, some of
whom did so without solicitati·nn on the part of this
··Protestant. ·This testimony contrasts with that of the
following witnesses for the Applic:ant.
Mayor Berger: Hiasn 't used the bus for years; C'ommissi,oner Hansen. Never uses the bus himself; Albert·
E. White: Uses the bus just

occas~onally;

H. M. Mor·ris:

Us·es the bu.s occasionally; Kenneth Farr : Rides the bu·s
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from the University of Utah to Murray (The proposed
serYice 'rill eertainly n·ot help him even as to fare~) ;
HarrY Eckman: RarelY
. rides the bus.
~

Despite the admitted efforts by applicant and the
city officials ·of ~Iurra.y, the attack made on the adequacy
of Pr{)testant's serYice to Murray, Midvale and Sandy
w·as not substantiated.
This Pflotestant is ready to cooperate with full
investigations in connection w·ith complaints made either
to Protestant or to the Public ·Serviee .Commission that
its service or rates or schedules in any de~tail a.re
improper or inadequate. It had n•o notice, however, that
the Application of the Airway Motor ~c·oach Lines, Inc.,
f.or a. c.ertificate of convenience and necessity in ·this
case, would be a. clearing house with respect to these
matters. ,,. . e submit that to :hottom the issuance of a
certificate of ~onvenienee and necessity ·on ·such .evidence
and immaterial issues would be a violation of fun·damental concepts, a. view· perhaps shared by the Commission in this ease aeeounting for the silence of the Rep,ort
with respect to Findings on this pha~se of the evidence.
And if Findings were to be made, the evidence eould
afford no other .conclusion but that the existing service
was adequate; this is certainly to be presumed from the
fact that the serviee as to r-outing, fares and s·chedule.s
was rendered in aecordance with orders of the Defendant Public .Service Commission, empowered and charged
under the statutes (Sec. 5, Chapter 65, LHws ?f Utah
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1'93'5) to assure the public the standard of serVIce
prescribed by Section 76-3-1.
( 4) The ·Commission has failed to find whether or not the

existing service being rendered by protestants other
than plaintiff in the territory affected is reasonably
adequate to meet the needs of the public; and if not
in what respects such existing service is inadequate~
and whether or not said protestants have been and now
are ready and willing to render adequate service.

With respect to the service of the Salt. Lake & Utah
· ·Railroad Company, witness Henry Bringhurst of Bennion thought that the Salt Lake· & ·Utah Railr·oad ·Company op-erated three trips per day (R. 246, Tr. 133),
although the ~Commission found it. to be :a fact that five
trips each wa.y were operated daily (R. 51).
·The witness Davis admitted t~ha.t he had erred with
respect to his eonsidera tion of the service rendered by
the ·Salt Lake & Utah Railroad ·Ciornpany, having assun1ed
that the .Salt Lake & Utruh. provided but two trains per
day. He did not know anything with respect to where
.service was rendered or what the time schedules W·ere.
He signed the application in question without carefully
.c-onsidering the,se matters (R. 147-8, Tr. 34-5).
d!i.screpancies in the 1nap
E·xhibit B (R. '34)

~have

T;he Commission

at~t1ached t~o

The

the application and

already been pointed ·out.

~should

have n1ade a. finding on this

point, and as in the case of (c) above, the evidence will
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only support a finding' that this existing .service wa.s
adequate and "~as being rendered pursuant to order,s of
the Publi·e SerYice ·C'ommiss1on.
(5) The Commission failed to find what service, if any,
into territories other than those now served by plaintiff and other protestants, is necessary and convenient
and in the public interest, and whether or not plaintiff,
or other protestants, has been and now is ready and
willing to render such service.

Witness ·Henry Bringhurst (R. 244, Tr. 13'1) testified
that he lived in Bennion with a population of ahout 400;
that transportation facilities were confined to the Salt
Lake & Utaili Railroad (in the extent of whose serviee
he was about 50% wrong as above pointed out) and to the
use of individual ca.rs which were owned hy practically
every family in Bennion (R. 248, Tr. 135); that four or
:five buses per ·day to Salt Lake would be good s€rvice
(R. 250, Tr. 137) (the same number of trips bein-g
rendered by the Salt Lake & Utah Railr;oad ·C;ompany
unknown to witness); tha.t .about 16 to 18 people per day
travel :b-etween Bennion and !S;alt Lake, 90% of whom
would use applicant's buse·s instead of private conveyances ·Or the ,Salt Lake & Utah (R. 2·56, Tr. 143); and that
he was not interested in ·Costs, but only in service to the
community (R.. 255, Tr. 142). We submit this testimony
1

may support an argument that the additional service is

convenient, but certainly not necessary.
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·The same pertains to the testimony of ~George Hyde
of ·Cres·c.ent living 3/8 of ~a mile west ,of the State Highway (State Street); he had dis,cus.sed the proposed
service and thought that 90lfo of the 200 people in east
and l·nwer 'Cres-cent were favorable to a bus line; (R. 261,
Tr. 148); that about 100~/o :of the families in this di·strict
had ·cars, but that it would he a n.ice tlhing if there could
be a bus in addition; that he was not interested in costs
of operation, but in service and what the patrons would
have to pay (R·. 264. Tr. 151). Incidentally the Town of
Cres-cent already has bus service furnished by the 'Salt
Lake & Utah Railroad Company (Exhibit B, Record
471, Tr. 359').
D'avid Harker (R. 283, ·Tr. 170) and John Pixton
(R. 287, Tr. 174) of Taylorsville have wanted more ~servic.e; through Pixton 's ·compLaints and orders ·of the Public.
Service ·Commission, service was inc.reased by the
Traction ·Company to Murray for a year to a;hout the
2.4th day of December, 19·39, but the additional patrtonage
did not :Support the increased service .and the ·extra bus
was discontinued; fares have been 1slig[htly
Pixton believes there is a.

cry~ng

redu~d;

need for bus service

bet'ween Taylorsville- and Murray; there a.re about 150
to 1'6·5 families in Taylorsville, lots of whom work or
are students in Salt Lake and drive their cars in to
Salt Lake .and take their neighbors; Pixton felt it to
be very iwconv'enrient not to have a 10c fare to Murray
and a 2!2. minute S·chedule (R. 289, Tr. 176).
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Jleredith Page of Riverton (R. 335, Tr. 2:23) testified that there are about 3,000 ·persons in Bluffdale, L·a.rk
and H·a.rriman ~ that the people in RiYerton comment in
favor of buses and better serYices; that there a.re two or
three carloads of private cars and students tr1avelin.g to
Salt Lake each day; and that bus service would be a lot
more cant· enie1l.f ( R. 338, Tr. 226). (Incidentally Lark
is eight miles and Harriman six miles from the territory
proposed to be serYed by the applicant.) Page is an
automobile dealer and most of the people in this vicinity
have their own ears, but bus service ,as a stavnd-by convenience in addition to private -conveyances and the Salt
Lake ·& Utah ''ould be an advantage (R. 339-340, Tr~
227-228).
Royal \T. Beckstead of 1S•outh Jordan testified that
there are about 800 people in his .community which was
served by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad c~ompany
(R. 342, Tr. 230); that w1hen people travel from his
community they go to Midvale and on through to Murray
and Salt Lake; tha.t most of these people now own and
travel by their own cars (R. 343, Tr. 231); that.in addition the school district renders bus service for the
children; (R. 344, Tr. 23~2); and that three bus trips a
day would be an additional convenience. if some one
could not use their priva.te cars or use existing facilities
(R. 344, Tr. 232).
Witness H. W. Jorgensen of West Jordan said that
the

pe~ople

in his vicinity, about thirteen to fourteen

hundred, were served by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad
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Company (R,. 347, Tr. 235); were served by the Jordan
B';chool District as far as attenda.n·ce at school was concerned (R. 351, Tr. 239') ; iand either used their own cars
or walked when they did not use the public facilities
('R. 354, Tr. 242.). The proposed cross-1Ctounty service
would be better than the present lack of public facilities
in tha.t. respect ( R. 363, 'Tr. 241).
1

John M. Peterson of Draper represented the Draper
Chamiher of ,C;ommerce (R. 384, Tr. 272). Draper had
been served by the applicant for about six months (R.
3'85, Tr. 273). He had heard no ·eomplaints about this
service, hut the more hours of the day that the service
could be handled the better. He would also like to have
service from D-raper to Bin~ham and Lark and to Magna
and Arthur (R. 386, Tr. 274). (Of ·eourse Bingham, L~ark,
Magna and Arthur are not included in the prop,osed
~service.) He also thought that there would he quite a
deSire -to. go from D~rap~er to Riverton, but in oheeking
the schedules .on ~cross examination found tha.t the
pr,o:posed serviee would hardly rfit this need (R·. 391,
Tr. ·2.79').
rnhe testimony of Joseph Bennion of Taylorsville
was similar to that of the other witnesses for .applicant
(R. 356, Tr. 244).
1

Witne;ss Woolley for the 'Traction ·Clomp any, whose
qu-alifications in the pub lie mass tra.nsporta t.ion field were
stipulated, testified that he had p·ersonally checked the
territory in question and was familiar with the density
of population and the .possibilities •of obtaining revenue
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passengt~rs

from mass transportation ~bus operation in
that vicinity, operating· either horizontally to feed the
State Street line, or n•orth and south of Redwood Road,
and bas~d upon this testimony stated -hci.s opinion that
the territory 'Yould not support the cost of operation,
(R. 440, Tr. 328). This testimony was likewise adopted
by stipulation by the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad ;Company ( R. 44a, Tr. 331).
In contr:ast, witness Davis for applicant, stated
that he had made no definite estim·ate of revenue, but
that frle felt that the territory "\vould support the cost of
the proposed service, and if it did not, ap·pli,cant would
resquest authorit:y to reduce or abandon service (R. 138,
Tr. 25).

Plaintiff submits that it would be difficult to make
·out a stronger ·Case to show that there is no necessity
for bus ·service into the proposed new territory than was
made by the applicant. The most that the testimony of
applicant's 'vitnesses in this respect can support is a
finding that the proposed mass transportation operati,ons
would be .a .convenient standby service £or a majority of
the people, and could not hope to· pay the bare costs of
operation.
A glance at Exhibit ''B" a map originally p-repared
by applicant, but corrected by protestants by stipulation

to eliminate a deceptive appearance and to show the true
situation, indi,cates at once that the applicant renders
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·service into the entire e;ast end of Salt Lake ·County; the
Tra<;.tion Company to the. c-entral part; and the Salt
LHke & Utah Railroad Company to the "'estern part and
th~ south-central part; .and the only gaps are the cr~oss
county co~ne-etions which the appl~cant has thrown in
by way of a stU!b bus operation, ( R .. 130, Tr. 17), f,or the
purpose of acquiring public. .support 'vith the success
illustrated by the testimony ,of J·ohn M. Peter·son of
Draper. This witness was particularly anxious on behalf
of the Draper Chamber of ;Commerce for cross-county
servi,ce from Draper to Bingham, Lark, Magna and
Arthur (R. 386, Tr. · 274). His attention 'vas called to
the fact that the scope ,of the present application involved
only .service between Draper and Riverton, which he felt
would he well taken ear.e of by granting the application.
But on cross examination it developed that the schedule
of applicant (which he had not seen previously) would
leave him stranded in Riverton without a possibility of
returning, (R. 391, Tr. 279).
C.ertainly if there is a need it is not of the publi.c
as a. whole, but only of a few individuals whose husbands
hav-e their cars, or who, for .some other reason, de·sire a
convenient standby service w1hich can be taken rather
than any other n1e:ans ·of reaching a particular destination. In this applicant's witnesses were unanimous.
~:rhe

Report of the ·Commission makes no finding at
all -on this issue, except to com·men.t that some of the
terri tory has bus service and s·ome has not, and to conclude that '' *

*

*

even though 'some of the territory
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is no'\Y being given c-on1n1on ·carrier service, public corivenienc.e and necessity would justify the issuance of t!he
authority requested by the a.pplie.a.nt, so that the aforementioned territory \Yhich does not now have common
carrier serviee might be afforded the opportunity ().f
such service." (R. 52).
Plaintiff submits that, were· findings to be made on
the above evidence, a.pplica.nt has failed to meet i t.s
burden of proof to show that the prop·o,sed serviee would
not only be a. ·eonvenience, but also a reasonable neces.sity
for the p:voposed service as distinguished fr?m the CJonvenien-ce. While the word· ''necessity" is not used in
the sense that the ·service must he essential or absolutely
indispensable, still the need mu·st be such as to warrant
the expense of making the impr.ovement. In other words,
mere ·c.onvenience is not eno-ugh, but the inconvenience
occasioned by· lack of service requested must be so gre~t
as to amount to a necessity not only of individuals, but
to the people of the community or territory a.ffeeted at
large and as a whole. (Railroa.d Co. vs. State, (Okla.)
252 P. 849·; Fornarotto vs. Public Utility Com.mission.ers,
(N. J.) 143 Atl. 450.) But there are no Findings at all!
Finally it should be pointed out that the findings d>O
not ·cover the undisputed evidence o.f plaintiff that the
'Traction ·Company had been and then was willing to
.comply with all lawful ·Orders of the Public IS.ervice C·ommission with res~pect to its existing operations, (R. 434,
Tr. 322) and with respect to ·extensions of .service (R. 439,
Tr. 3'27).

T.his testimony adduced through witness
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Woolley on behalf both .of the Traction Com.p-any and
the :Salt Lake & Utah Railroad Oompany was repeated
R. 43, Tr. 331) in order that there ·Could be no misunder~standing of the attitude of the protestants. <4>
1

(

( 6) The Commission failed to make findings as to whether
or not the proposed service would be an unnecessary
duplication of existing service rendered by plaintiff and
othetr protestants. (5)
We discus·s hereinafter the reasons why the finding
on this issue, if made, w·ould have to he that the proposed
serv.ice would be an unnecessary duplicati,on. The point
made here is that there is no finding re,sponsive to this
important issue.

B. - The Commission has made Findings of Fact not supported by any substantial evidence:
Not only has the Commission failed to make findings
on material .and necessary issues, but in at le:ast f:our
(4) "Mr..Behl·e: This is repetition, but I want to make the point clear.
Mr. Woolley. as manager of the Traction Company, if the Commission ,should determine by lawful proceedings that there is a
need f.or additional s-ervice, and should so find, is your company
willing to comply witth aLI lawful orders of the Commission with
respect to the rendering of such additional service?
"Mr. Woolley: Yes, sir.
"Mr. Behle: And like·wise, with respect to any changes or modifications with respect to the existing service now being rendered
by your company?
"Mr. Woolley: Yes."
(5) See Point C-3, page 4.S infra.

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

29

respects its so-called findings are not supported by any
substantial evidence in the record.
(1) ·On page 3 of the R.eport (R. 51) the Commission

finds:
"'The rates now· in effect are the lowest tha.t
this C·ommission has been able to procure. How·ever, voluntary reductions would at any time have
been in order. \Vb.e:a the C·ommission has sought
reductions the attitude of the Traction Company
has been till. at the op·eration of this line, as als•o
the operation of the Traction ,system as a whole,
yielded little or no return upon the investment,
and if the Murray-Sandy line were granted further reductions, it would mean that the now
meager n;et returns ,of the T;rac:tion C'ompany
would be further reduced and the users of the
service in Salt Lake City would be forced to carry
in part the ·costs of the service beyond the city
limits.'' (R.eport p. 3, R. 51).
The .present personnel of this Commission were
parties :before this Court in the ease of McCa.rthy vs.
Public Service Commission of Utah, 77 P. (2d) 331, 9·4
Utaili. 304, wherein

thi~s

court said, on page 338, with

respect to the Commission's claim that it could consider
its own records in connection with any application:
''' * * * It does not .app·ear, however, that
these rooords or permits were p·ut in evid·ence ~nr
made .part of the record before t'he Commission
in the matter of the permit No. 125, or in the
later reeord made upon plaintiffs' petition for
rehearing •nr reconsideration. In such case they
are not properly a part ·of the record on review
in this court. Los Angeles & :S. L. R. ·C'o. v. Pu,blic
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Utilities C'ommis·sion, 81 Utah 286, 17 P. 2d 287,
291; Spencer v. Industrial Commissi:on, 81 Utah
'511, 20 P. 2d 618. Plaintiffs were never confronted with such re{~to·rds as .evidence and have
iha.d no opportunity before the 'Commission to
oppose them with obje-ctions as to competency, to
the inferences or conclusions drawn therefrom,
or to rebut the same by other evidence. They are
I\Ot affected thereby in this eourt. ''
Yet that portion .of the report above quoted departs
from any evidence at the hearing in setting forth as
findings, presumably material to the result reached by
the c·ommis·si·on, statements with respect to certain
informal conferences whi.ch the Tr.a.ction Company purportedly had with the Commission. Plaintiff, until the
time of the promulgation of the Report and Order now
under review, had no intimation that the Commission
would depart from the record, had no opportunity to
cross examine on thls "testimony", was not confronted
with these records as evidence, and w.as not given an
· opportunity to oppose the inference's drawn therefrom.

(2) On page

3 of the Report

(R. 51) the 'Commission

also mak.es a finding, or at least a contrast, !between the
present rates ·of protestants and the proposed rates.
Plaintiff submits that the record is barren of any such
contrast of 46 percent, and of eourse the proposed rates
of prot·estants do not appear in the Report on which this
fallacious contrast is based.
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E:rllibit 1-C (R. 42) contrasts the proposed fa.res of
applicant and the fares of the Salt Lake & Utah Railroad
·Corporation. Ex.hibit '''E" (R. 38) sets forth the Traction Company fare.s, and the proposed :fares ,olf the
Airwa.ys a.re set forth in full on page 2 of its application
(R. 2). The percentage figure us-ed by the .Commis.sion
appears incorrect. Yet this .portion of the Rep•ort ha~s
been widely quoted throughout Salt Lake County in order
to gain popular support for the applicant, no mention
being made of the other general statement on page 4 of
the Report, (R. 52) tha.t ''In the cases of students, transferees and riders with weekly passes, the rates of the
Traction Company are deeidedly more favorable than
the rates proposed by the appli~ant. * * * ''

(3 & 4) The Report

·On

pa·ge 4 (R. 5·2) finds:

* * there is at the present time no
reason to suppose that such . patrons will not
-continue to enjoy the benefits of these rates.''
'' *

Again on page 7 of the Report (R. 55) the Commission finds:
"The granting of this application will not
·substantially detra·ct from nor impair existing
common carr11,er sem;ce . * * . ''
•

•

::ll:

Not only is there no evidence to supp·ort such findings to the effect tha.t the Traction ,Qnmpany or the Salt
Lake & Ut~h Railroad Company will not suffer from the
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proposed •COmpeti·tion, but nhe evidence, and the admissions in the ple·adings are all to the contrary.
We have heretofore pointed out that applicant
admitted through the pleadings the fact that that part
of the propos-ed service in so far as .operations between
Salt Lake C.ity, Murray, Midvale and 18andy were con·cerned, was ''in direct -conflici'' with the existing service
,of plaintiff. ('R. 45 ). The defendant, Airway Motor
·Coacih Lines, Inc:., further admitted in the pleadings that
the granting of its a;pplication w·ould je~opa:rdize the
ability .of plain.tiff to ,oovn1timlue to render service south. of
Thirty-third Sowth (R. 46). Responsive to this admissi;on the Wi.tne,ss Davis testified with respect to this
duplication (R·. 1~29-131, Tr. 16-lS, :and quotations from
testimony set forth in foot-notes 1 to 3 supra). On cr,oss
examinat.ion he stated that '' * * * there isn't room
1

for ·our operations and the ·Traction C!ompany operations
in this territory.'' (R. 164, '·Tr. ·51) ; that by vtirtue of
applicant ''s lower rates, ,more frequent ·s,chedules, easier
riding equipment, more -courteous treatment of passen·gers and better salesmanship, the Airways eould successfully eompete with the Traction ·Company's servi-ce, but
that if the Trac:tion Company lowered its rates to compete
1

with thos-e ·Of the Airways, "that might work quite a
hardship upon us" (R. 165, ·Tr. 52.).
1

T!hese

adm1s~s1ons

a,nd this testimony ,are consistent with the tes,timony of
the witness Woolley for the Traction Company,' to the
-effeet that the result of the p·roposed dup·li:cation would be
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that there 'Yould not be enough revenue "f.or either ·one
to eYen come JJ.ear breakin·g· eYen" (R. 459, Tr. 347).
T1hus the Order of the Commission (if sustained),
based in part upon these erroneous Findings, is now
creating and "'"ill continue to create a situation of
disastrous a.nd destruetiYe eompetition, harmful not only
to the partie-s involved~ but to the public-the puhli·c
w·hich, based ·On S'ad exp·er;ienees along this line, had
legislated to prevent su.Ch situations from arising again.

For the reas-ons hereinabove .set forth plaintiff submits that the Report and ·Order under review s~hould 1he
vacated and set aside, and the proceedings remanded to
the defendant Public Service C:ommission, with directions
to cDmply with the law and make proper Findings. As
this Court has said, ''the Commis·sion .should be careful
to ·make proper finding-s respe-cting the material ultimate
facts upon which an order is based,'' and if this had
been done in the instant case, the errors hereinafter
discussed may not h·ave oecurred.

C.

Tlie action of the defendant Commission in issuing the
Report
Order under review is contrary to law, in
violation of statute, and arbitrary and capricious, in
the following particulars:

ana

(1) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity although applicant has not obtained
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fmnchises or licenses from the local County and City
auth~rities concerned, as required by law.

The Commission,by its order has is.sued a C:ertificate
of C'onvenience and N eces·sity, although defendant,. Airway Motor Coach Lines, Inc., has not obtained franchises
or licenses from the local ·Ctounty and city authorities
~concerned,

as required by law. Sub-section 3 of Section

7'6-4-24, Revised .Statutes of Utah 1933, .specifically dire.cts
the ·Commis·sion to condition the granting .of a certificate
upon a sihowing that :

''' * * * such applicant .~has receiv.ed the
required ·Consent, franchise or permit of the
proper county, state, municip~ality or other puhlic
authority. * * * If a public utility desires to
exercise .a right or privilege under a franchise or
permit which it .contemplates securing hut "\vhich
has not yet been granted to it, such public utility
may ·apply t;o the Commis~sion for an order
preliminary to the is·suing of the certificate. T·he
Commission may thereupon make an order declaring that it will, therefore, upon application, under
such rules and regulations as it may prescribe,
issue the desired certifica:te upon such terms and
·Conditions as it may designate after the public
utility ha.s obtained such eontemplated franchise
or permit. Upon presentation to the Commission
of evidence satisfactory to it that such franchise
-or permit has been secured by such public utility,
the C:ommission shall thereup!on issue · such
certificate.''
Paragraph 13: ·of the Application admitted that the
applieant did· not yet have these franchises (R. 3) but
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stated that arrangen1ents 1had been made for obtaining
the necessary franchises or licenses. The testimony
supported this allegation (R. 148, Tr. 3'5). C·ertainly the
Commission had this requirement in mind when Commissioner Holbrook called this matter t·o the attention of
applicant (R. 153, Tr. 40).
As stated by 'Yitness Davis .at this time, (R. 153, Tr.
40), the applicant was follo·w·ing the second alternative
provided by the statute above quoted. Yet the Commissi·on mas not only ·made no finding responsive to the
allegations of the Applieation and to the undisputed
testimony, but failed to follow the statute in the particulars aibove quoted and granted the certificate effective
immed1atel~.... Thus applicant under the Report and Order
under revie'Y possesses a certificate of convenience and
necessity, but has n·ot obtained a permit, franchise, or
license from Salt Lake City, Murray, Midvale or Sandy,
or from any of the other conununitie.s. This situation
was not only not contemplated by th-e statute, but is
ex,pres.sly prohibited thereby.

(2) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity despite evidence on which it itself has
found that applicant has not the financial ability to
to properly perform the service proposed.
(3) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity without taking into consideration the
existing transportation facilities in the territory p-ro..
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posed to be served by applicant and the effect of the
proposed service thereon and the otfer of existing
facilities to furnish any additional or Supplemental'
se~rvice determined by the Commission to be necessary
and convenient, thus creating an unnecessary duplication of service.
1

( 4) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity based not upon findings of convenience
and necessity, but on a contrast between rates and
schedules of the various protestants, concerning which
no adequate findings are made, and applicant's proposed
mtes _and schedules.

Before dealing with the f.nregoing vital points may
we outline briefly our conceptions .of the basic scope and
limitations of and upon the administrative process which
we contend the Public SeTvice Commission failed to
apprehend.
:We conc.eive the fundamental nature of the administrative proce-ss to be well stated in the recent opinion of
the Utah Supren1e Court in the case of Rowell vs. Sta.te

Boa.rd 01f Agriculture, 99 P. (2d) 1, ______ U. ------, wherein it
is said:
''That the Legislature may not surrender or
delegate its legislative power is elemental.
''It may, ~however, provide for the exeeution
through administrative agencies of its legislative
p·olicy, and may confer upon such administrative
officers -certain p·o·wers and the duty of determining the question of the existence o.f certain facts
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upon 'Yhirh the effect or execution of its legislatiYe policy 1na~T be dependent. * * *
"B.ut in the delegation ·of such authority the
Leg·islature
must clearlY
'
. mark the course to he
pursued, and th·e principles., facts and purp·o·ses to
serve as g-uide posts to enable the offic:er to carry
out, not ~his O\Y11 will or judgment but that of the
Leg-islature. * * *''
As we all know the Legislature of the 1State of Utah
in 1917 created the Public Servi·ce C·ommission a.s an
3dministrative agency f.or the purpose of p.roviding for
the execution of its legislative ·policies with respect to
public utilities.

Upo.n the Public Service C·ommis.sion

was conferred by the Legislature of this State eertain
powers and responsrhilities, including the duty of determining the question of the existence ·of certain facts upon
which the execution of the legislative polic:y of the State
of Utah may be dependent.
The public policy laid down by the L·egislature w'as
a mandate for a regulated monop-oly in the public utility
field for reas•o1ns familiar to any student of the public
utility question. In the case of

Commission, 247 P. 284, 67 U.

Gi~mer
22~2,

vs. Public Utilities
decided in 1926, this

eourt said on page 287 :

"* * * Mr. Spurr, hy reas·on of his position as the editor of the Publi-c Utilities Reports,
is no doubt well qualified to .speak upon the subj.ect of sta;te control of public utili·ties. In diiscussing that subject in volume 1 of his work entitled
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Guiding principles of Public Service R-egulation,
at page 31, the author says:
,., 'What do these provisions -of the
statutes with reference to certificates of
public convenience and nHcessity signify~ As
.a matter of policy, why .should a public utility
·company require commission consent before
beginning .operation while those engaged in
~private enterprises can do business where
they will~ Public •and private industries were
once on the same footing in this respe·ct. The
maxim that competiti·on is the life of trade
was held to apply to public as well as primte
business. C·ompetition, being thought well
of, was weLcomed in all kinds of business.
Experience proved, however, that business
rivalry in the publi.c utility field was had,
both for the companies and the public. So
the policy of discouraging rather than en•couraging competition between public service
companies was adopted.' ''
1

This ·case involved motor carriers wh·o .desired to pa.rti·cip~ate in the available business on a competitive basis,
and •on page 289 the Court said :

'·' * * * ·Every public utility necess,arily
must operate in accordance with both the letter
and the spirit ·of the Public Utiliti-e.s Act and the
authorized conditions imposed by the commission.
The v·ery purpose of the Ut·ilities Act is to- prevent
one public wtility from destroying another. When,
therefore, it is made app.arent t~o the commission
that the increase of the number of ve•hicles or
trips by a :eommon -carrier which is using the
public sitreets and highways must necessarily
result in seriously affecting the ability of another
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utility to render serYice, or perhaps destroy its
ability to do s·o, where the serviee is rendered hy
the other ,public ut·ility partly in N1e sa.n1e territory
and partly in territory extending beyond the territory served by the utility first mentioned, the
commission undoubtedly may interfere to prevent
sueh disastrous results. T·he com.mls.s[:on wa.s
created for that very purp-ose, and, where its
orders are within its jurisdiction and the bounds
of reas·on, and are not capricious and arbitrary,
this court c.annot interfere.'' (Italics ours).
Lest one think that this public poli.c.y of regulated monopoly has been changed in the intervening years to one of
reguLated competition despite the eontinuanc~ on the
books of the same Statutes, we quote from the opinion of
the same court in 19:38, where in the case of McCarthy

vs. Public Service Commission of. Utah, supra, it is s.aid
on page 335 of 77 P. (2d):

* * The available supply ·o.f business
over a given route or over all routes covered .bY
their ·common facilities ·is the source from which
the earnings of each carrier must come. Whatever
subtracts from the total volume of business is
a diminution of earning -capacity for those who
·must compete for :and share in the remainder and
who have equipped themselves at large expense
for carrying a larger share of the business. True,
no carrier has a property interest in any specific
bu8'iness ~or shipment until he actually gets it,
.connects with it, appropriates i:t, by contracting
therefor with the shipper. But he is entitled to
his cha.n·ce as a co-mpetito-r at all the business there
is as against anyone proceedi·ng unlawfully or
without due authorization of the statute to divert
·or ·appropria·te any part of it. The rights of com·•' *
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peting ·Carriers to share in a stream o.f transportation business flowing ~over a given route or highway may well be likened to the rights of rival or
competing appropriators of water from a natural
S'tream or source of supply, wher'e there is insufficient water in the source to fully satisfy the
wants or needs of all. In such -case, every a.pprop.ria tor or user of water has a beneficial interest
in prot·ecting the supply of -water in the natural
.stre.aJm from unlawful diminution, even before it
reaches his own ·headgate and hefore he has made
:any ·specific water in the stream his ·own. And he
is entitled to his ·day in court or a hearing before
the official charged with policing the stre.am and
distributing the water of the S'tream, to protest
against any unlawful act of wastage or distribution of the water. ''
And again on page 3,37 :
''·Every such permit, every act of transportation, tends t.o p·roduce eompeti tion for busine-ss,
and increased activity to get and control business.
But ·compe-tition is not, i~n itself and always, a
benefit to t·he public. ·o-r in the public jnterest; not
any more than i~s 'monopoly always in the public
interest. Rather, it lies in a medium between the
two. A!s well said in a recent case, People's Transit C·o. v. H;enshaw, 8 Cir., 20 F. 2d 87, at page 90:
'' 'The results of sueh competition, where
there is not sufficient business to ;sustain all
of the .competitors, is that a season of experience cause·s all or some to drop out or compels the purchase of competitors (usually at
exaggerated amounts), thus ·ea.using an in-crease of ,c!api tal exp-enditure .of the pur·Cihasers upon which the charges to the public
mus't be based and thereby increased.
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~ ~ ~ rrhese
considerations, and others,
an1ply justify differenees to protect and
prest"\l'Yl~ the existing permanent sys~tem. No
ne\Y system has a le·g·al right to destroy such
existri.ng systPm and haYe the publir at its
mercy. The :public \Yelfare is not served, but
harn1ed there:by. The public may protect
itself against such resu}ts. Nor can any
theory of free competiti,on CJhange this situation. C:on1petition is recognized and enco-uraged for the sole reason that it is .suppoS<ed to result in the public good. But
C'Ompetiti·on is not neces·s1arly unrestrainable.
It cannot be allo\Yed to harm the very public
it \Yas de~signed to protect and aid. It m.ay
be restrained for the public \velfare just the
same as monopoly may be restrained or as
competition 1nay be left unrestra;ined. ·The
test in each in,st·ance is the publi'C good.
Where the restraint upon competition is f,or
the public good, it is sustainable just as
restraint up-on freedom ,of acti·on by the
individual is valid where for the.public good.
Such is the basis of and the reason for the
entire police power.' ''

ITisofar ·as public utilities are concerned, the Legislature of this state, ''testing'' the public good, has determined by Title 76 tn create and regulate monopolies.
In 193-5 the Act was amended with respe-ct to .common
ID·otor carriers and by the provisions of Section 5, Chapter 65, Laws ·of Ut•ah 1935, the Public Service Commission
was empowered and charged as foll·ows:
·C'ommon motor carriers -Powers
.and duties ·Of eom'missi,on. The commissi-on is
v-ested with po·uJer and aut ho1·ity, a;nd it shall be
'' 76-5-5.
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its duty, to sutpervise and regula1te all common
motor carriers and to fix, alter, rergulate and determine just, fair, reasonable and sufficient rates,
fares, ·charges and elassifications; to regulate the
f.a.eilities, accounts, .serviee and safety ,of operations of ea;ch sl}ch common motor ·carrier, to regulate operating and ·time schedules so as to meet
t1he needs of any c.ommuni ty, and s-o a.s to insure
.adequate transportation serviee to the territory
traversed hy such common motor carriers, and so
as to prevent u1vnecessary dup.Zioation of service
betUJ'een these common motor carriers, arnd between them aflrt.d the lines of compe1ting stearn and
electric railroads; and the ·eommission may
require the ·C:o-ordina.tion ·of the service and schedules of -competing common ca.rrier.s by motor
vehicles or ·electric .and steam railroads, to require
the filing of annual and other reports, tariffs,
s-ehedules and other data by such .common mtOtor
carriers, and to supervis·e a!nd regulate such common motor carriers in all rna tters affecting the
rela,tion betw·een su0h common motor carriers and
the public and between ·such common motor carriers and other ·common carriers, to the end that
the provisions of this chapter may be fully and
conipl·etely earried ·out. The comn1ission shall
have power and authority, by general order or
:otherWJise, to prescribe rule's and regulations in
·conformity wi~th this act applica!ble to any and
all sucJh eommon mot•or carriers, and to do all
things_nece,ss·ary to carry out and enforce the
provisions of this a:ct. All laws relating to the
powers, duties, authority, and jurisdiction of the
commisision o¥er eommon c.arrtiers are hereby
.made applicable to all su·ch -common motor carriers
·except as herein otherwise specifi·c,ally provided.''

With respect to the issuance of certifi-cates of convenience and neeessi ty the Legislature by Secti,on 6 of
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Chapter 65, preseribed ''guide posts'' to enable the
Commission to ·Oa.rry out, not the judgment or will of the
Comnrission, but that of the Legislature, in the following· terms:

'' * * * Before granting· a Certific.ate to
a comn1on m·otor earrier the ~Cormnissi~on shall
take into consideration the financial ability of the
applicant to properly perform the servi~ce sought
under the Certificate and also the character of
the high\Yay over \Yhich said ·c.a.m~mon m·otor carrier proposes to operat·e .a'nd the ·effect thereon,
and upon the traveling public using the same, and
also the existing tra·nsportation faeili ties in the
territory p·ropos·ed to be served. If the C~ommis
sion finds that the applicant is financially un:able
to properly perform the s·ervice sought under the
eertificate, or that the highway over which he)
proposes to .operate is already sufficiently burdened with traf£ic, ·or that the granting of the
·certificate applied for will be detrimental to the
!best interests of the Stat·e of Uta1h, the ~commis
sion shall not grant such certificate."
P:araphrasing thes·e guide ·posts by which the C'ommiss~on '' sihall be guided'' (See opinion of Mr. Justice
Wolfe in the Rowell.caJse, page 10 supra, as to construction of statutory working ''shall consider'' to be equivalent ·of "·shall be guided by") we see that the Legislature has ordered the C·ommission (in addition to finding .a public need and convenience) to find from 'evidence
adduced at a public hearing:
1. Whether or not the a:pplicant is financially able
properly to perform the serviee sought under the- applicati·on.
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2. Whether or not the highways over which the
appli.cant pr·oposes to operate will be adequate to accommodate additional traffic.
3. What the existing traJllsportation fa ci1ities, if
any, in the territory pr·opos·ed to be served a.re, and what
the effe,ct of the granting ·Of the application will be upon
thos-e existing transportation facilities.
1

· Upon the determina t[on of these facts the Legislature ha.s directed the Commission to deny applications if
those facts rus so found .show that (a) Applicant is financially unable to properly perform the servi·ce sought
under the Certificate, or (b) that the 'highway over which
he pr~op·oses to operate is already sufficiently burdened
Wlith traffic, or (c) that the granting of the Certi:fi.cate
•applied ror will he detrimental to the best interests of
the people of the Sta,te of Utah. In this latter conneetion
the legislative man·date is that the Commission s'hall
prevent unne,cessary dupliea.tion ·of servi,ce between
common motor carriers. (.Section 5, C·hapter 6;5, Laws
o:f U tab 1'93'5).
Plaintiff submits that the Ciommission has violated
the legislative mandate of its ·creator .and h'as failed to
perform its statutory duties as hereinbefore prescribed.
Unles~s checked by t:his ·court the result will be to repeal
the pu!b1ic poli.cy 'of the State of Utah and substitute in
lieu thereof a ·competitive situation between the Traction
C'ompany and the .Airway Motor ·Coach Lines, Inc., with
the prospe-ctive result which the legislative puhlic policy
of this IS.ta.te was designed to p·revent. In other words,
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as the ·Order no"T .stands tihe Tracti~on Company must
con1pete. or be displaeed, despite the fact that "the very
purpose of the Utilities Act is to prevent one public utility
from destroying another." Gilmer vs. Public Utilities Comn?rissl~on, supra. Let us see in "That respeets the Commission has erred in order to reaeh this .st'ate of affairs.
(2) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity despite evidence on which it itself has
found that applicant has not the financial ability to
properly perform the service proposed.

With respect to th!is issue the evidence that applicant has lost $8,240.00 ·of its capital of $9,400.00 in two
and one-half years (R. 158, ·Tr. 145), that it has cash
on hand of $13·6.48 (R. 6), that operations in P~ovo
resulted in an -operating loss of approximately $4,000.00
(R. 134, Tr. 21), and that the Draper operation was
unpr·ofitable (R. 141, Tr. 28), fully supports the finding
of the Commission that ''the finan·cial -conditi·on of this
applicant at the present time does not s-eem to justify the
expansion that would be n·eces sary to undertake the pro1

pos·ed service" (R. 53). The C·ommission further found
'':the assets ·of the applicant are only suffi,cient at present
to sustain the ·operations ~conducted under the C·ertifi:cates
heretofore iS'SUOO by t'he

a~ommission

for a peri-od of two

more years at the r,ate at which these ass-ets have been
diminished in the past .two years.

* * * At the

present time the current obligations of this Company

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

46
relating to the Utah operations are a pprorimately equal
to ·existing assets.'' (R. 53, 54).
The mandate of the Statute reqwired that t,he application, ther·efore, be d:enied in accorftafYlCe with this finding. Yet notwithstanding the statutory provision the
·Commission granted the application and issued a certificate of eonvenienee and ne·cessity ef£ective immediately
('R. 56, 57). · The effect of this, it is submitt·ed, wa1s a
nullity in that the order was void.

R·e.cognizing this statutory requirement, but seeking
to avoid its mandate, the Commission attempted to justify
its action by requiring .applicant (R. 57) to se,cure "not
less than ·$15,000.00 cash in hand through the s.ale of
capital stock in the Corp-orat~on, said sum to be used
for the benefit of the Utah operations, to finance the
purchase o[ needed equipment ·of a type to be approVied
by this C·ommission, and to assure the financial stability
of the D·orporation. * * * "·on or before June 1,
1940. If the granting of t'he authority is c.onstrued to
be conditional upon a further showing, the record discloses no hearing and no sueh further showing. True on
May 7 and after this point had been raised by the Petition
for Rehe-aring, the applicant filed an affidavit (R. 103,
104) to the effe·ct that this additional .capital had been
rais·ed, hut ·Certainly this sel,f-serving affidavit filed ex
parte 0an not he considered a substitute for a further
hearing on notice.
T·he evidence shows that the applicant has failed to
meet the expense of its operations in P'rovo, Mill Creek
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and in Draper, and the population 1n the vicinity of
Crescent, Riverton, ''Test Jordan, B.ennion and Taylorsville ·can not pay the costs of .mass tra.nsp,ortation if th·e
Mill·Creek, Draper and Provo territory can not. Substituting '''bus route'' for "road" the oprinion of the
New York Suprem-e Court in the case ·of Peop·le v-s. Board
of Railroad Co nun issiouers, 108 N. Y. S. 288, wherein
the action of the Railroad Comn:iission in eertifying as
to the neces'Sity and convenience for an additional railway servi-ce was reversed, is applicable here. We qu·ote:
'' * * * From the record it is extremely
probable that the road cannot pay runnin·g
expenses. It therefore would apparently he a
financial cripp.le from the start, and there is no
public necessity .for the construction of a road
which cannot maintaan itself and which must
inevitably be bankrupt fr.om the beginnin·g. ·Sueh
a road in this territory cannot be a puhlie convenience or necessity.

"It is unne-cessary to go into detail as to the
estimated business and the probabilities that t~he
·Company may do such business, and the probable
cost of operation and maintenance. The ·evidenee
as to the p:vobable business and shipments is evidently mere guesswork and greatly exaggerated.
A mere statement of the locality of the proposed
road and the manner in which that locality is now
served by the ra.ilroads clearly indicates that
there is no necessity f.or this road.''
Applicant has failed to meet its operating expenses
despite .such economies as paying his bus drivers s:Omewhere between $80.00 to $90.00 p·er month (R.. 163, Tr.
50) in .contrast to a litt1e over $130.00 per month paid
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employes o,f the Traction C·ompany (R.183, Tr. 70). On
cross examination· by .Commissioner Ho~brook, Mr. D!avis
indi·cated Ii.ttle knowledge with respe-ct to the operations
of the C1ompany (R. 156, Tr. 43), and he admitt~d (R.
1·60, Tr. 47) that applicant's •costs would be llc a mile
nof {~Ounting depr'eiciation, with prospe.ctive revenu'es
s~oon·ething less than lOc a mile. T~h.e feeling of the C~om
mission with respect to the failure of applicant to meet
its burden of pr,oof on this issue s-eemed· to be summarized in C:oriunissioner H·olhrook'~s statement (R. 170,
·Tr. 57): "Y.ou wouldn't really feel tha·t this C·ommission
would be justified in granting the application based
the financial statement p·resented with the ·applieation,
would y·ou ~ ' '

on

. Yet notwithstanding this testimony and the findings
of the c:ommission, the Commission adopted the peculiar
reas:0ning tha:t to provide an additional $15,000.00 which
applicant could lose in its ~opera~tions, would be· the equivalent of the ·statutory mandate requiring applicant to
meet the burden of proof of ~showing that its proposed
operations are economically sound a.nd that it is :fi.nanciaJly able to perform the service sough.t.

( 3) The Commission has issued a Celrtificate of Convenie·nce
and Necessity without taking into consideration the
,,
existing trru,sportation facilities in the territory proposed to be served by ap~plicant, and the offer of e~~ting
. facilities

~:to

furnish any additional' or suppleme·ntal
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service determined by the Commission to be necessary
and convenient, thus creating an unnecessary duplication of service.
With respee.t t.o this gu·ide p-ost delineat~ed by the
Legislature the Commission proreeeded t·o ignore uncontroverted e·vidence and the stipula ti~ons of the parties,
n1aking no finding wha.ts~oever resp-onsive to the evidence
~nd admissions, and making fin·din·gs unsupported by
evidence as hereinbefore set forth. Turning to the Reeord
for evidenc.e on this issue, w·e find:
~T-he

proposed service at first was designed substantially to duplicate the Utah :Li·ght and 'Traction Company service to Midvale and Sandy (R. 131, Tr. 18).
Thereafter the cr·oss-·county s·ervic.e between Riverto-n,
Draper, Midvale, Sandy, Murray, Taylorsville and Bennion was developed (R. 136, Tr. 23), to be served by a
shuttle bus as an adjunct to the main operations dupliea.ting the Traction ··service (R. 130, Tr. 17), and to be
diseontinued if unprofitatble (R-. 16·2, Tr. 49). D~avis at
first d·enied but then admitted that these additi,ons and
proposals were offered to obtain popular support ( R. 137,
Tr. 24). Apparently appliicant was willing to make any
promise with respect to rates, s-chedules, routes, service,
territory to be ·served and bonds to be poS'ted (R. 168,
Tr..5·5) or any other -conditi~on, just so ap·plicant could
be permitted to start operating. Exact knowledge of
either cost ·o.f operation or prosp-ective revenue soeemed
no more important than the fwc:t that applicant had lost
$8,000.00 in its operations during·the the past tw·o years.
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The· P·resident of the C:ompany and its only witness with
respect to these matters was not even sure what the
extent of applicant's losses had been (R. 158, Tr. 45).
Mr. Davis admitt~d ·on cross examination that the
first eonta.cts with respect to the proposed service came
from Murray (R. 13-2, Tr. 19)'(6) ; that C:ommissioner
Hansen ·On behalf of Murray City offer~ed applicant a
franchise as one inducement to make this application
(R. 134, Tr. 21); that subsequently applicant contacted
offi cials ·of Midvale City with respect to an extension otf
the servi0e to Midvale and Sandy, and proposed a fare
of 20c (R. 13:5, Tr. 22). Having given this figure by oversight (or perhaps finding that this was the Traction Company fare and, therefore, no inducement for obtaining
support from Midvale and Sandy) the prop·ose-d fare was
lowered to 15c (R. 13'5, Tr. 22). (A twenty-five percent
reducti~on in revenue ap·parently meant little or nothing,
although such a redu-c:tion would generally he vital to
other businesses.)
1

Boiled down, we have a. C·ompany ·npera,ting on a
small margin and at cut rates planning to invade territory served by protestants, and t:he problem presented
itself of escaping fr,om the pr·ovisions of the Utah Sta:tutes providing for a syS'tem of regulated ·monopoly in
(6)Mr.
and
Mr.
Mr.

Me·lville: (R. 93, Tr. 80) "The whole thing is Murray's case,
ours is ~the same; it is identical."
Behle: "Your case is Murray's ca•se?"
M·elville: "Yes sir; we are interested in the same things.

* * *"
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this respe-ct. The applieant, f{)rced to admit that a du.p~
lication of serYiee \Yns pro·posed \Yhich would jeopardize
the ability of plaintiff to furnish its existing serviee, took
eYery •coneeiva.ble step to ereate popular support for its
appl.icati{)n in the hope that the Commis·sion, as it did,
would endeaYor to side-step the proYisions of la\v. The
defendant adn1itted in its pleadings (R. 45) that th·e
prup·osed serYi•ce \Yas a duplication but alleged it was
justified because:
1.

Plaintiff's service south of 33rd South was inade-

quate and irregular. But as hereinbefore pointed out the

the defendant failed in its attack on serviee; and the
matter ·of inadequate and irregular service was not at
issue in this ease involving convenien.ce avnd necessity.
The only e:x;cuse for the existence ·of the defendant, Puhlic
Service ·Commission, is to regulate and .supervise utilities.
Section 5, Chapter 65, La\vs of Utah, 19'35, supra, not
only Yests the C-ommission "\\-rith p·ower and authority,

but makes it the duty ·Of the Commission to supervise and
regulate common motor carriers, to £x, alter, regulate
and determine just, fair, reasonable and suffi cient rates,
1

fares, charges and classifications; to regulate facilities,
serviee, ·operating and time schedules in order to meet
the needs of any

~eommunity;

and to in.s'u.re adequa.te

transportation service to the territory served. Defendant
Commission has never hesitated to perform its duty and
deal with complaints with resp-ect to service in the way
contempl,ated by Statute, but the entire subject was
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immaterial in a hearing on an application inv·olving the
necessity and convenience for a new service.
2. The public favored the Airway's application because
this service was inadequate and irregular. But this· is imm·a.teri·al to the case at hand because .the puhli~c has its
remedy with respect to complaints concerning inadequate and irregul,ar service.
3. Plaintiff's fares were excessive and thus prohibited
general public use of its service. This contenti·on is ~con
sidered in our final point.

4.

Plaintiff's operations south of 33rd South were

unprofitable. Plain tiff submits that it knows of no legal,
moral or social sanct1on vesting in applicant, Airway
Motor C·oach Lines, Inc., a duty self-imposed, to pertf.orm
the services of guardian for the plaintiff, admitting
solely for the sake ·of argument the truth of the contention.
5. Applicant was offering additional service to other
communities without service, contingent upon the granting
of the entire application. This was an admitted addition to
a·ecomplish another and the ultimate end (R. 137, Tr. 24).
But the new service did not lbecome necessary for this
reason, 'because this additional .service if needed could be
obtai,ned by the proper exercise of the duties of the Commission as pointed out by c:ommissioner weisley in his

diss.ent (R. 109').
The conclusion Is ines·capable that the service
authorized was _an unnec~ssa.ry duplication contrary to
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law, and the order, therefore v;oid, unless justified by
the matter of rates dealt w·ith herea.fter.

The Ari~ona ~Supreme Court has recently taken
occasion to point out t·o the Arizona Conllllission the
proper procedure required by the statutes in a ca.se
decided October 2, 19'39: Oorpora.tion Commission vs.

Pacific Greyhownd Lines, 94 P. 2d 443. In this case the
court reasserted the generally underst;ood rules with
respect to such matters in the following language:

"* * * The proper procedure to be followed by the commis·sion, under the circumstances
set forth in the record, was as follows : It should
first have examined the new service offered hy
the applicant and determined whether it is more
in the interest of the traveling public than that
furnished by the plain1iff. If its answer is in
the affirmative, it should then offer to the plaintiff an opportunity .to furnish such new .servi·ce,
and if plain tiff ~can, and will, do so, should deny
the application. If it cannot, or will not, furnish it,
and. the ne·w seryice offered 1ean reasonably be separated into two parts, one being a service which
can and will, be furnished hy the plaintiff, :and the
other one which, for any reasion, is beyond its ·
power to furnish, and thi:s .separation will not
injure the interests of the traveling public, the
·commission should then issue· a certificate au·thorizing the applicant to carry on such portion
of the service as it is beyond the p·ower of tme
·plaintiff to furnish, but prohibiting it from giving
such -serviee as .can, and will, be given by the
plaintiff. :Lf, however, the new servi-ce offered
cann.ot thu~ 'be reas-onably separated,· the commis-
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sion should then issue the certificate of convenience and ne·cessi ty for the new service to the
applicant. This CJourse preserves as a paramount
~consideration the benefit to the traveling public,
while still protecting the interest of the existing
·certifica·te holder so far as it can be without injury
to that public."
·This principle has been given express re-cognition by
this Commission in the past ; In Re Blue and Gray Bus
Line, P. U. R. 1924-A, 449. There the Public Utilities
C·onunission of Utah said:
'·"To further deplete the revenues of the
street railway system by autbo.rizing a competitive bus service, would only result in further
restricting the company's ability to give service,
and if competition were carried to its logical con·clusion, would utterly destroy the service so
neeessa.ry to the many. It is the neces·sities of the
general traveling public that must be considered,
rather than the .eonvenience of the few.''
This principle is also to be f.ound in the decisions of
every Commission and Court where regulated monopoly
is the publi.c ;policy of the 1S:ta.te. For exam·ple, se·e Bartonville Bus Lines vs. Eagle Mo tor Coaah Lilne, 157 N. E.
175 (Ill.); Egypti.arn Tra.nsp~ortation System vs. Louisville
Railro1ad Comp·any, 152 N. E. 510 (Ill.); Cihicago R.aJilroad Company vs. Com1nerce Commission, 167 N. E. 840
(Ill.); Annota)tion 67 A. L. R., 957, and .cases P. U. R.
Digest, ''Monopoly and Competition,'' Section 61, '' Opportunity for Present Carrier to Provide New Service,''
and ''-Automobiles,'' Key 83 of the American Digest
System.
1
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From the latter Chicago rase

"~e

quote briefly:

HIt is contended that there \Yas no substantial
eYidence sho\Ying that puiblic eonveniernce ,and
nec.essity required the bus service. It is not th·e
policy of the Public Utilities Act to promote competition bet\Yeen common earriers as a means of
proYiding servi·ee to the publiic. The policy esta;blished by tha.t art is that throug~h regul~a tion of an
established earrier oecupying a given field and
protection of it from competition the public will
he served more efficiently and at a more reasonable rate than if other competing lines were
authorized to render the same public service in
the same territory. ~1ethods for the transportation of persons are established and operated by
private capital as an investment, but as they are
public utilities the state has the right to regulate
them b~T such reg·ulations as are reasonable. The
policy of the Public Utilities .Act is that existing
utilities shall receive a fair mea;su.re of protec:tion
against ruinous competition. Where one company
can serve the public conveniently and efficiently,
it has been found fvom experience that to authorize a competing company to serve the same
territory ultimately results in requiring the public
to pay more for transp·ortation in order that both
com·panies may receive a fair return on the money
invested and the cost of oper·ation. The Commerce C-ommission has no arbitrary powers. Its
orders must he reas·ona:ble and l~awful and the
·que.stion whe.ther they are so or not is subject to
review ·On appeal. To authorize the Commerce
·Commission to grant the coa,ch eompany a certificate of convenience and necessity and authority
.to operate its lines to serve the same public·
already served hy ~the appellants, it was required
that it be shown that appell~ants were not render-
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· ing adequate and convenient service .and that the
operation· of the buS' lines would elminiate sucth
inadequacy and inconvenien'Ce. In determining
that ques ti·on the primary ·consideration is the
~convenience and necessity of the public. Whether
the puhli,c 1c:onvenienee and neeessity require the
establishment of a ne·w transportation facility is
not determined by the number of individuals who
may ask for it. The public must be concerned as
distinguished from any number of individuals.
Wes.t Suburban Transp. 'Co. v. Chicago & W. T.
R. Co~, 309 Ill. 87, 140 N. E. 5·6; Choate v. Commerce Commi,ssion, 309 Ill. 248, 141. N. E·. 12.. T·o
authorize an order of the Commerce c~ommission
granting a certificate of convenience. and necessity
to a carrier though another is in the field, it is
necessary that it appear, first, that the existing
utility is not rendering adequate service,
· and it is .but ·a matter of fairnes-s and justice that
it be :shown tha~t the new utility is ~n a p·osition to
render better·· se-rvice to the public than the one
alre·ady in the field. It is in a·ccord with justice
and sound business e0onomy that the utility
~already in the field .be given an opportunity to
furnish the required .service where it offers and
is ahle to do so. Egypti·a:h Transp·~ System v.
Louisville.& N. R. C:o., 321 Ill. 580, 15·2 N. E. 510.
. Whe-re additional or extended service i~s required
in the interest of the public and a utility in the
field makes knowill its willingness and ability· to
furnish the required service, the C·ommer:ce Commission is not justified in granting a certificate of
iCOnvenience and necessity to a. compe.ting utility
until the utility in the field has had an opportuni·ty to demonstrate its ability to give the required
1
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serYiCt'. B.artonville Bns L[ne v. Eagle Motor
·Coa~h Line, 326 Ill. 200, 157 N. E. 175. ''

!This "sugar-coating" of the Application did not,
plaintiff submits, make the proposed duplication of
serY1ce necessary.

(4) The Commission has issued a Certificate of Convenience
and Necessity based on the contrast between rates _and
schedules of the various protestants, concerning which
no adequate findings are made, and applicant's rates
arid schedules.

As indicated hereinbef.ore, .the defendant Airway
M-otQr Coach Lines, Inc. attempted to meet the st~tutory
mandate against a.n unnecessary duplication by claiming
the admitted dupl~cation of service to be n-ecess·ary
because plaintiff's fare.s were excesisive and thus prohibited the general pu!bli;c use ·of its serviee ( R. 45).
Analysis -of the Report of the Oomm1ssion indicates
that the reasoning for granting the application seems to
be based up-on three premises1. That there is some territory (no specific finding)
south of Salt Lake City in ~~alt Lake C1ounty, _which does
not now have comm-on carrier service, but w'hich might
have if the application should be granted.· (No finding
as to need for this service). (Re1port p. 4, R. 52).

We

have heretofore pointed_ out _th~ errors in tpis pre~ise.
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2. ·That the granting of the ap:plication would not
affect the existing servi.ce. (Report pp. 4-7, R. 52-55).
vVe have likewise pointed out the errors in this premise.
3. ·That the appli,c.ant offers lower rates in some
instances. (Report p. 3, R. 51). This matter i~s now conside.red at this point.
C·ounsel for applic;ant admitted that the only real
basis for support of the a:ppli,ca.tion \vas the matter of
fares. In urging the ~c·ommission to overrule plain tiff's
objection to evidence vvith respect to rates on the ground
that the hearing vYas as to convenience and necessity for
the proposed service and not a rate hearing with respect
to existing service, Mr. Melville stated (R. 44'8, Tr. 336):
"if the Q.ommission \\Tants to rule out fares, we are out
altogether. There is no use holding a hearing that I
can see. The w.hole issue is improper fares ; that people
can't ride-if the fares can't be gone into.''
Over plaintiff's objection this matter was considered
iby the Commission and, as indieated above, appears to
be the main factor in the pr·omulgation of the O·rder
unaer review. we have heretofore P·Ointed out that in
s-ome res!J)ects the findings of the Commis·sion on this
evidence were incorre0t as to the :Contrasting fares, and
in many respects were incomplete.
The hearing upon t:he ap:pliea.tion of the defendant
Air,Ya~~

Motor Coaeh Lines, Inc. \vas upon the question

of the issuance of a certificate of convenience and necessity pursuant to the provi.sio·ns of ·Section 6, Chap. 65,
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La,Ys ·of Utah 1935; it wa.s not a rate hearing pursuant
to Sootion 5, Chap. 65, La.,vs of Ut·ah 19·3•5. This the
presiding· Conunissioner himself rec-ognized by his oral
comment during· the hearing (R.. 120, Tr. 7).
1

;So far as we kno'Y the cases are unanimous in the
States """here the public policy w··ith respect to utilitie·s
provides for reg·ula'ted m'on-opoly, to the effect that ratemaking has nothing to do with service ; that it is not in
the public interest to permit established utilities to have
their business destroyed by new companies attempting
to engage in '' eut -t~hroat" competition inviting retaliation 'Yith mutually disastrous results; and that complaints with respeet to rates are to be corrected by
regulation pursuant to statute through rate hearings,
and not by destructive c:ompetition. ·To -correct excessive
rates by proper proceedings is not ·only within the
powers of the defendant 'Commission, but is its speeific
duty under the law. (Sec. 5, c·hap. 66, Laws of Utah
19·3'5). (See eases digested in the P·ublic Utility Report
Digest under the heading ·Of ''.Monop·oly and Competit~on' ', Sees. 40 and 48, and '' 1 Cer~ti:ficates of Convenience
and Necessity'', Sec. 89).
As was stated by Commissio ner Wiesley (R. 108),
to bottom the issuance of a. certificate of convenience
and necessity upon a ·eontrast of rates is to a.dmi't "either
its unwillingness or its irrabili,ty to functi~on as required
by the Act bri'nging it (the Commission) into exis,ten(~e. ,.
1

* * * 'The de:par.ture seems particularly unfortuna·te
in the instant case, because the utility already in the field
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must ·continue to· meet its schedules, or, with our permission, abandon this porti~on of its service. If the rates
pr,oposed by the appli,can.t 'are fair and proper, then the
exi~sting serviee can and should he required to operate
on them. But such rates might well be reasonable with
only one operator in the field, and ye~t result in competing opera tors with parallel lines a'nd division of the tntal
revenue, bo,th losing money. Here we have the essence
of departure from regulated monopoly."
:The claim that a proposal for lower rates by a new
utility sh·ould he given 'Consideration in granting a certificate of convenience and necessity has been made heretofore without. avail, particularly in connection with
eontra·sting rates of existing railway, and proposed motor
bus, ·carriers. Typical are the decisions of the Interstate
Commerce Commission under the· F'edera.I Motor Carrier
Act of 193~5, 49· U. S. C'. A., Sec.tion 301, et seq. The
questio'n was first raised in the case of In Re W ellspea:k,
1 M. 'C. C. 71'2, de-cided April 2·2, 19·37, where the ·Commission said:
"'The evidence shows, however, that the
.traffi~c transported by applicants consisted largefy, if not entirely, of traffic there'tofore handled
~by other carriers. The only convincing evidenee
as to the reason f·or applicants' ability to ·ohtain
this traffic is the fact that they published and
ap.plied lower ra~tes. ·There is no basis for a :finding tha.t rates .of carriers ·now in operation are
too high and, even if that should be the case, that
fact alone w.ould. not justify the issuance of certificates to additional carrier's in this territory. Any
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rected by us upon complaint in accordance with
tJ1e proYisions of the Act. The evidence does not
warrant a. finding that the.re is public need· f.oi the
p:voposed service but, on the contrary, indic.ate·s
that the existing facilities of carriers who have
conducted operations for a number of year~s are
adequate to serve the needs of the shippers.''
Com~m,on

In the matter of Harrison & H'a1rrison

Carrie'r Application decided ·September 7, 19·37, 3 M. C.
C. 7·6, the C:ommission cited the \Vell·speak case and said:
''There is no basis for a finding that rates orf
carriers now in operation are too high, nor would
that fact alone be an element to be considered in
determining whe~ther the p.resent or future puhiic
convenience and necessity require the addition of
another operator in that territory. Any unlawful
motor-earrier rates ~can be correeted by the C!ommission upon complaint I'n accordance with the
.provisions of the act.''
In that ease interested merchants testifying in sup·port
of the Application stated that the service rendered by
existing carriers was inadequate, inconvenient

~and

unsat-

isfactory, that shipments we.re damaged in transit,
deliveries made at inconvenient times, an·d that the
tran-sportation charges were exorbitant.

O~n

the other

hand witnesses ·called by protestants testified·. that the
existing service was adequate and efficient and

t~hat

the

available traffic was insufficient to support an additional
operator.
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Finally in the case of In Re J. N. Youngblood, 8 M.
rC. ·C. 193 decided July 11, 1938, the C·ommission stated:
''·To sum up, the .evidence adduced by applicant, in an effort tn show that authorization of
his proposed operarti.on is required by the present
and future public convenience and necessity,
shows no definite advantage of any nature which
would accrue to the public by reason thereof, ex·cept the possibility of lower rates. The evidence
.shows that the traffic 'Pr;oposed to be transported
will consist entirely of traffic heretofore handled
by other established ·carriers. The only convincing evidence as to applicant's ability to obtain
this traffic is the fact that he proposes to charge
'a lower rate than that now being charged by
other earriers. There i·s no basis for finding that
ra te·s now in operation are too high, and even if
,that should be the case, that fact alone W·ould
not justify the issuance of a .certificate to an additional carrier in this territory. If the rates of
existing earriers are unlawful, they may be investigated by the Commission upon complaint, in
accordance with the provisions .of the a~ct. The
evidence will not support a finding that there is
public need for applicant's proposed service, but
on the contrary, it justifies a .finding that the
existing facilities of -carriers which have conducted operations f·or a number of years are
adequate to serve the needs of the ship'Pers. ''
We are not aware of any further cases decided ·on
thi·s point by the Interstate Commerce Commission· for
the reason, as state·d a.t the hearing by C!omm.issioner.
Granger, (R. 16:6, Tr. 53) that evidence with respect to
e:ontrasting rates is now eliminated entirely in hearings
involving -c-onvenience and nece·ssity.
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·The f.oregoing cases are also interesting in their
suggestions as to the nature of the findings which a regulatory body should pr.operly make in a case involving
eonvenience a:nd necessity, and V\rhich as \Ye have heretQifore pointed out, are totally lacking in the present
Report ·of this Commis·sion. rr'he m·otor-carrier cases are
replete ·with applications for certlificates .and we are
unable to find a cas.e comparable to the one before the
C·ommission where a. certificate ha~s been granted. The
rule seems to be uniform that where the evidence shows
the existing service to be adequate and tall that is justified by the pr·esent use thereof, where there is n·O' prospec:t
of increase in demand sufficient to justify an additional
operation, where the feasible necessity in the public
interest and applicant's ability to carry out the proposed
operations are doubtful, and the success o.f the proposed
operation depends ,on the diversion of patrons from
existing op·ertators, the application for a certificate should
be denied.· This is the eviden·ce in the instant case.
F,or example see In Re Slpeirs Application, 1 M. C.
C. 555; In Re Ritz Arrow Lilnes, Inc., 1 M. C. C. 339';
In Re D.a/Vis Application, 1 M. C. C. 68; In Re Land Application, 2 M. C. C. 759·; and the many other eases in the
Motor-'Carrier Rep.orts collated in the Ha.wkins IndexDigest-An,alysis of decisions under the Federal M:O'tor
C'arrier Act, Ite-m 510.
·This ruling is also .enunciated in the case of W es~t

Suburbatn Transportation Company vs. Chicago cf; W. T.
Railwa.y Comp·avny decided by the Illinois Supreme Court
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in 19 2:3, 140 N~ ~- '56. T·his cas·e is proba:bly· the leading
case to what i·s the public policy under the, yarious regulatory acts regulating new competition and: the choice
of applicants, and what factors s~hould be given weight
and what should not in connecrtion with the issuance of
a certificate of convenience and necessity. For. example,
it is ·the key case in the Smith, Dowling and Hale '':.Case.B·ook on Public Utilities'' published in 1936. In view
·of the importance of this ca·se we take the liberty of
quoting extensively from the opinion therein written by
1

Chief Justice Farmer of the Illinois Supren1e Court:
''If the transportation f acili ties furnished by
appellee are so inadequate as to subject the public
to inconven~ence, and the operation of appellant's
bus lines would eliminate that inconvenience, the
·order of the commission was auth.orized. It is
not the policy of the PU!blic Utilities Aert (SmithHurd Ann. St. e. 111-2/3, Sections 1,. 2, no,tes,
:Section 3 et seq., and notes) to promote competition between common carriers as a. means of providing service to the public.
The policy
estahlish.ed by that Act is that, through regulation
of an establi·shed .carrier oecupying a given field
and protecting it fr.om competition it may be able
to serve the public more efficiently and a.t a more
.reasonable rate, than would he the oose if other
competing lines were authorized to serve the
public in the same territory. Method$ for the
transportati,on ~of pertsons are estahUshed and
operated by private capital as an investment, but
.as they are public utili tie's the state· has.:.the right
to reglllate them and their charges, so long as
such regulation is reasonable. ···,The policy of the
Puhlic Utilities Act is that existing utilities shall
receive·· a ,fair .·measure· of protec.tiorl. agains·t
1

1
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ruinous eompetition. Rates of fare charg~d ,~or
serYieP are· subject to regulation by the Commeree
Qommission \Yithin reasonable limi·ts, :but the commission has no po,ver to make a rule or order
regulating a utility w'hich would amount to a. eonfisca.tion of its property or require opeTation
under conditions '"·hieh W'"ould not provide a reasonable return upon the investment. Where one
company can serYe the public conveniently and
efficiently, it has been found from eX'J}erience that
to authorize a competing eompany to serve the
same territory ul·tima tely results in requiring the
public to pay more fior transportation; in order
that both companies may reeeive a. fair return on
the m·oney invested and the .cost of oper ation ...
1

'' The ·Chicago, Burlington & Quincy Railroad
runs south,ve-st from the Western Electric plant,
thrtough Cicero, Berwyn, Riverside, Brookfield,
La Grange, W-estern Springs, an·d Hinsdale, and
performs a large part of the transportation of
t·he pu!hlic in those tO'wn•s. It- has 15 stations between the _Western Ele;ctrie plant and Hinsdale,
a distance of ahout 8 mile-s, and runs 19 to 34
trains each way per day. ·This suburban service
accommodates people desiring to go to points in
the city of c·hieago, as well as peTsons desiring
to ·stop a.t intervening stations between the Western Electric pla.nt and Hinsdale. It does n·ot
rappear that the public bas ever made any complaint that the transportation service in the
towns mentioned was inadequate or insufficient,
and no proof wa.s offered on t·he hearing· to that
·effect except the testimony of appellant's officers,
and their testimony is not impressive. Only a
comparatively small portion of the population of
the West T.o~s would be more conveniently
served._by the ·Operation -of the bus l~ne·s.
'' The Commerce Commission h~s n,o arbitrary
p1ow~rs. ..Its orde.rs must be reasona.ble and lawSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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ful, and the question whether they are so or not
is subject to review on a!ppeal. Public. Utilities
C:o·m. v. Toledo, St. Louis & Western Railroad Co.,
267 Ill. 93, 107 N. E. 774; Chicago Bus Co. v.
1Chicago Stage C:o., 2.87 Ill. 320, 122 N. E. 477.
To
authorize ~the c.ommerc.e Qiommission to grant
appellant a certifieate of convenience and ne.cessity, and authority to operate its lines to serve
the same public already served by an existinlg
utility, it was required that it be shown the existing utility was not rendering adequate and eonvenien t service, and that the operation of the bus
line would eliminate such inadequacy and inconvenie-nce. In determining that ·question the
primary consideration is the convenience and
neces~sity ·of the pu!b1ic. Public Utilities Com. v.
~Cleveland, Cincinnati, Chicago & St. Louis Railway Co., 288 Ill. 502, 123 N. E. 547. Wihether the
pubHc .convenience and nece·ssity require the estah1lishment of a new transportation facility is not
deter1nined by the number of individuals who may
ask for it. The public must be concerned, as
distinguished from any num:ber of individuals.
Public Utilities Com .v. T·oledo, St. Louis & \Vestern Railroad c·o., 286 Ill. 582, 12·2 N. E. 158.
Si0n1e individuals-perhaps a considerable
number-would be convenienced by the operation
of the bus lines; but it is clear f:flom the rec:ord
.that to the great body of the public it would be
neither a convenience nor ne.cessity. It "'-as not
within the authority of the .commission to' authorize the operation of the hus lines f:or the convenien:ce of a small part of the public already served
by other utilities at no very great inconvenience.
The order appealed from stated the bus company
proposes to operate its transportation facilities
at a lower rate of fare than the public is now
paying, and in appellant's brief it says the f·are
~charged is 5 cents; but the order does not fix
''

1
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the rate of rare to be charged. Assunring- appellant is limited to a 5-cent fare and appellee is
eharging a larger rate, H1at ~Yas not, of itself,
sufficient to authorize the order of the commission. The commission had authority to regul,ate
the rate charged by the appellee, and if its fares
W'ere excessive to reduce them. Fares are not
the only thing to be considered in a case of this
kind. The public is interested and vitally concerned in adequate t.ransp!orta.tion facilities at
reasonable rates, and the state is interested in
a.ssis·ting to get them: but the state cannot, as we
have said, require a. carrier to furnish service at
a rate whi·c.h will not pay a fair return on the
investinent and cost of operation. vV·e are not
advised that any complaint had ever been 1nade
to the commission that appellee is charging excessive· rates, and s:o far a.s this ·Case is eoncerned
we vYill assume it is not ,doing so. The effect of
aut·horizing the operation o.f the bus lines at a
lower fare to serve the same territory would be
to decrease appellee's revenues, and, if t~he rate
it is no'\\' charging is a reasonable one, to require
it to ·operate at a loss or increase its rates. This
would be against the public interest, because appellant's lines eannot aeco1nmodate m~ore than a
comparatively sn1all portion of the public in the
matter of transportation.
''The superior c.ourt f.ound and adjudged that
the orderr of the commission was against the
manifest ",.eight of t-he evidence heard, that. the
operation of the bus lines is n:ot a convenienc.e to
the public and a nec:essary transportation facility,
that the present transportation facilities are not
ina.dequa.te and do not subject the public to inconveniences 'vhich will be elimina~ed by authorizing
the operation of the bus lines, and that the order
and de·ci~ion of the commission are unreasonable.
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· We are· of opini·oil the decision ·of the superior· ·
court was right, and its judgment is affirmed.''
Despite the absence of proper findings hereinbef,ore
discussed, the applicability of the above opinion to the
instant case insofar as the la.w and evidence are concerned is readily apparent.
A case appearing in the South Western Reporter
a dvance sheet of March 19, 1940, appears to us to like- .
wise .deserve emphasis. Eldridge vs. Fort Worth Tran.sit Gomp,arny, 136 S. W. (2d) .9:55, deci~ed by the Texas
·Court of Civil Appeals. It appears from this case that .
the City of FoTt Worth, Texas, is a charter -city empo~ered 'to' grant franchises to utilit'ies, but. that such
grants are· suhje~ct to the follo·wing restri·ction eompara:hle to that of the Utah S:tatutes applicable in the
.A:irway ca.se: '' * * * ·such privi,lege over: and upon
the ·same public streets,. alleys, highways, and thorough- ·
fares of the City shall not be granted to any person or
corporation excepting when public necessity and convenience may require such use * * * '' The Fort
Worth City Council held a hearing on notice with respect
to the application of two ·tndiv,iduals for a franlchise for
the: purpO.se of determining whetherr or· not the public~''
Clonvenience and necessity required the granting o.f a·;·
p·rivrlege for the furni;shing of additional mass transpor.tation service within the City of Fort W·orth. Such
hettr_ing was neither -called nor conducted as a rate cas-e
1

and the evidence showed without dispute that the service
ah:eady rendered in ih~ Qity was adequate, with full
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equipment, personnel and s~hedules, and ,that the existing eo!npany '"·as ready, able and willing to furnish any
additi~onal serviee which might be necessary or reasonably required: :further that the. .exi~ting. comp1any 's
equipment was ample and sufficiently modern, safe, convenient and comfortable, and that if any further service
should be authorized pursuant to the appli,ca:tion sam·e
would be a duplication of the existing service. No evidence was offered showing t·hat the fares charged by the
existing ·company were excessive or unreasonable. T!he
applicant proposed a five-cent fare, however, in contrast
to ·higher existing fares.
Mter the hearing the Ci,ty, as did the Commission
in 'tp.e Airway case, found that there· was a public neces~ .
sity and ·convenience for the proposed service, and th·e
re9ord of the Council indica ted, as d!.oes. the Report in
the.. instant caise, that the basis for this necessity and
convenience was the lower proposed

··:The

-co~rt held tha-t thi's finding ' 'was arbitrary and

capri~ious an~
m~.de

fare~

without reas·onable hasis of fact

an~

was

withq.ut proper n:otice or hearing with respect to

such .: .rna tter. ''

In enjoining further action under the

a.pplication. the court said:
''We hold that whet,her or not 'public.necessi,ty and convenience may require such use' of
the Sttreets, a·s the ordinance her:e under . a ttaiCk'
attempts to give, is a quespion o.f fact that must
he established by competent and .satisfa;etory
evidence, .in the light -of the. existing ·conditions.
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If this conclusi on of ours is not s·ound, then
the City Cnuncil could arbitrarily an1d capriciously pass such an ordinance a.s is under discussion
anct wrongf:ully injure the vested pvoperty rights
of any public s-ervice corporation, -operating in
·the City of Fort Wior;th under a lawful franc:hise
or privilege, by declaring that 'public necessity
and convenience' requires such action.''
'''

1

1

The court pointed out that the Charter ·of the City
gave the governing body ample aut'hori~ty by proper
proceedings ,to regulate rates, and t10 compel any public
service utility to extend its service when there is a reasonable demand therefor.
At the he'aring the Comm,issinn itself did not seem
wholeheartedly to adopt the view urged by applicant,
f.or the Commission directed qu~stions t10 the witnes;s
Davis indicating a foreboding that the appliea.tion was
a prelude to .a. competitive servi1ce and to an auction·block procedure based upon rates. (R. 166, Tr. 53).<7)
(7)"Q. But you figure if their rates .are to remain as they are and
yours as you propose, you would operate in competition?
''A. That is right.
"Q. So you are not necessarily asking tJhat 1their authority be
cancelled?
"A. No.
"Q. Do you believe that the rates should be the major element in
determining convenience and necessity?
"A. I think that the rate plays the major impor,tance; rates and
.s-chedules.
"Q. Rates and schedules?
"A. Yes.
"Q. And your more frequent schedule would become one of the
elements?
"A. Yes.
"Q. Do you .know that the Interstate Commerce Commission absol-
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T·he view that the public policy of regulated monoJWly should be discarded in favor of competition, as will
be the effect if the Ortder of the Commission in this case
is sustained~ "\Vas also expressed publicly hy other witnesses supporting· the application, e.·g., M:ayor Berger
of Murray (R.. 202, Tr. 89).
Other parties to the proceeding, however, sensed
tha.t the injection of the rate factor would result in competition, to the injury of the publi·c.
·Thus E. B. Kelsey, appearing for the Street c·ar
Men's Union expressed the view ,of th'a·t organization that
the pr.oposed fares of applicant were in no small part
possible at the expense of wages paid employes, and
would not allow sufficient income to the company to

"A.
"Q.

"A.

"·Q.

"A.

utely refuses :to consider rates as any part of convenience and
necessity?
I don't know that.
Would you feel that if this Com·mission were to grant this
application which you now make and .slx months fro.m now
another applicant should come along and propose a 9 cent fare
and a 14 cent fare, wtth a 15 minute service, that that applica·
tion ·should be granted and yours cancelled?
We feel this w.ay about that, if anyone can come along at any
time and offer the public something, with assurance that it can
be fulfilled that ·we can't deliver to the public we feel that we
are w.illing to step down at any time.
And you think tJhat'·s the ele·ment that this Commission
should give weight to in reaching a decision?
I think rt:hey should; I would consider that public necessity and
convenience. First, there are a lot of ,people in thi-s community,
or .any other community, to whom rate structure ·means a lot.
There are low-paid people in every com.munity that the difference between 5 and 10 cents over a period of a week means
a little difference in something they mig·htt have to have to eat
in the house over that period of time; and I really believe that
a rate is very important, especially in an opera.tion that is
conducted for the purpose of transporting people to and fro·m
their work."
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ma:int~in

the. standa.r·d.of wa.ges ·set up hy his· organizatien: (R: 3.73, T-r. 261). .Again, Mr. J~ R. Wilson, Presi-.
dent ·of the S:a:lt ·Lake City F:ederation of Labor (R. 11·5, ·
Tr.:·:2), prote~sted the granting of the ·a.pplicati;on for the
Same reason, and witness Joe B·arron of Midvale appearing on behalf of the Midvale Smelter M·en 's Union .
331 ('C. I. 0.) stated that his local was neutral with
respe·dt t·o the .bus lines; but that the standard of living
should he kept up·, and t·hat if the effect of. the granting.
of. the- a,pplication would result in t he .replacement of·
Trae;tion ·C:ompan.y employes making :a.pproxima,tely
$130.00. per month by employes of the applicant making
$80.00. to $901)() a month, .their organization opposed the
g:nantin·g of the application; that their ·organization
wou.l<l likewis·e opp·O'Se any effort of .the U ta.h· Light and
·Tra~tion C·ompany to reduce costs of op·erating to ·com~
pete ":.·with the· applicant's ·proposed fares by reducing ,
1

1

w;a.ge ra.tes to a. scale comparable to appli'c:ant 's. While
this witness prefe.rred to see

he~tter

service, and desired

at tlhe .same time ~to !sustain the 'w~ge level, he s.tated that
were .to b~ mad·e, he would.rathe;r,pay a higher
fare or~ endure less- servi·ce by. way of s-chedules th~an
if~· ~h_o,i~e

to

~ee" the

wages cut down (.R. 381, Tr. 26-9 ) .

."; Xs "s.tated ·in Mr. ·wiesley's ·'di~~·enting -.o·pinion,

''If'

th~. r~action c:omp~ny ':rates ar~ t~o high the' c'ommission'
1,,

'

;.

•

.

'

.

.

is. dereU.ct in its duty. if it .fails to ..investig.ate, proceed
,

a

.·,.

.

"

.-

-

tQ _;:4~·aring and .-order .· prop.er .and. neces~ary. modificJa~ .

tions:". (R._:l08).

..
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As stated by Mr. Woolley, the: Traction Company
could stand a 35 percent reduction ofi l'abot ciOsts before
the: ·Tratction Company W·Ould be pa.ying a. scale comparable to -that of applicant, and hy making this and
similar reductions, might meet the fares offered hy
applicant (R. 461, Tr. 349). But the Airway policy of
low rates has n:ot paid ·even their· opera~ting eos.ts in the
past,. and with the business divided, both compa;nJies
would. continue to lose money, and in competition continue to cut costs until eventually curtailment in service
or bankruptcy would affect the very public· now clamoring for competition. T·here is just no es1ea.pe from the
answer that the matter of rates under our system of
regulated monopoly has no place· in a ·~hearing with
respect to the granting of· a new certificate of convenience and necessi~ty, and that the Commission has made a
grave, serio}ls and fundamental error in; this. respect.

:Most members of the Bar afi,d students of Government recognize the. merits of and ne-cessities- for the
existence ·Of administrative agencies such as the defe.ndant Public Servi·ce Commission in order ..to deal efficie.n,tly
and a pp~~priately with our moder~. ·COmplexities of
society. To be "constantly guarded and ·checked, however,.. are the ·exer~pres·erit dangers of abuse of the
admi~nistra.tive pr-ocess;;, and· the fuhc;tion of· the courts
is to afford that check by. an appropriate judicial re~iew,
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but not to s~tifle or impede the funetioning of the administrative tribunal. <8 > The grave and fundamental errors
which plaintiff' claims have been committed by the c:om:rh1ssion in this case arise, we submit, from the failure
bf the majority . ·of the Commission to understand the
p·roeedure by which it is required and permitted to carry
the-"'1egislative mandate of its creator. Counsel for
plaintiff ·consider the personnel of the present Commis~ion as ably equipped and conscientious as any public
servants of this state. The importanlt issues of this
case .are not with respect to the result reached, but the
procedure of the majority of the Commission in reaching that result.

out

We sense that the maj·ority of the C-ommission acted
pursuant to their hest belief and jud·gment, expressing
their best views for the result rea·ched. Certainly 've
c.an appreciate the motivating force ·of the public pressure
put to bear; the public appeal of the applicant with its
proffer of lower far,es and more frequent service to
g~eater areas regardless of expense; .and the la~ck of
substantial revenues over expenses availwble to the
T·raetion Company -on this line, making abandonm·en.t of
servi1ce perhaps the easy way out.
But the Legislature under our Constitution can not
transfer its powers and prerogatives to the Commission
acting in a legislative capacity, nor has it done so in
this case. With, respect to a situation such as this the
i •.

(8) See 193.8 Ross Prize Essay by Prof. Malcolm McDermott, A.B.J.,
Vol. XXV, No. 6, Jupe, 1.939, page 453.
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Legislature has directed the Conunission as its agent
to hold a public hearing on notiee, and to m'ake findings
with respect to certain fact-situations has·ed upon substantial evidence to be adduced at the hearing, the burden
of proof'being upon the applicant. In failing to observe
this requirement of making finding~s responsive to the
issues, and in stret•ching the :findings ma1de to go far
beyond or eont.rary to the evidenJee adduced, the c·ommission has been led from its path of duty; for if it had
made these findings carefully and properly, the result
required by the Legislature dependent upon such facts
would have been clear, not as a result of the exercise
of the Commission's best judgment, but pursuant to the
legislative mandate. And in reaching that result, the
Commission could withstand and answer firmly any
criticism, public or private, by the plain fact that it had
performed the legislative coonmand and had dis.charged
its duty.
But in reaehing a result deemed the better of the
alternatives presented to the Commission in this vig~or.:.
ously-contested proceeding, \Ve submit that the majority
of the CommiS"sion has departed fr·om fundamental
principles, has a'cted in violation of the Statutes of the
State of Utah, and albeit in good faith, has acted in an
arbitrary and capTici~ous manner.
Respectfully
GEoRGE

suhmit~ted,

R.

CoREY

and

C~VIN BEHLE,

A ttorn.eyS' for Plain,tiff.
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